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ABSTRACT 
Individual’s past personal data proved to have unimaginable impact on his or her present and 
the future in particular the spent criminal convicts’ faux pas committed in the past might trap 
oneself to an unchangeable present and the future. This impact is greater in this advanced 
communication technological era when personal information is just one click away through 
search engines and potential victims might be reformed sinners, minor offenders, adolescents 
and prospective employees who want to represent themselves in consistent with the respective 
societal interests and values. A successful exercise of right to be forgotten, a derivative of data 
protection privacy right under GDPR can aid in characterizing this aspiration of reintegration 
through a new inception of reformed life by restricting the access of the concerned information 
online. Since access to information is an aspect of right to freedom of expression, both need to 
be weighed against each other to prioritize one in each case. The established concept and 
jurisprudence of RTBF does not guarantee any spent criminal convict to erase the relevant 
history permanently, rather only to delink the hyperlinks from the Internet search engines 
which makes the retrieval difficult. Even, to reach that far, a series of certain balancing 
principles suffice in motion which need to be evaluated to weigh between RTBF and free 
expression, such as, whether the process at issues is a lawful or unlawful one, data subject is a 
public or private figure, and proportional processing or privacy interests in motion. These 
characteristics make a RTBF application non-exclusive in nature since it cannot be guaranteed 
to spent convicts as admittedly, it must face the risk of rejection. 
Keywords: Data protection, Right to be forgotten, Freedom of expression, Spent convicts, 
Publication interest, Privacy interest, Internet, GDPR, Google Spain. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
The English philosopher John Locke considered trust and prestige are the two elements that 
humans consider the most on the basis of which humans instinctually manage themselves with 
the purpose of leading the emersion of the self-concept.1 Because of the Internet, the 
information is so willingly obtainable which remains online on a permanent basis, facilitates a 
permanent slandering on someone’s reputation2 which makes getting rid of from the past 
mistakes an implausible  event since an indefinite amount of data can be achieved by inputting 
the data subject’s name in a search engine.3 Advanced information technological means, ever 
growing fast communication, cheap memory, easy retrieval, collection of personal data, 
archiving and above all strong recognition of right to freedom of expression took remembering 
capacity to an unimaginable level. The phenomenon of forgetting is anomaly nowadays since 
personal data is just one click away in Google search. Problem occurs when a particular 
information brings an adverse impact on someone’s life by bringing facts to light. For example, 
in England, a woman’s name was published as a criminal for murdering her husband which 
shattered her any chance to move forward with such a record since it became the fuel of 
numerous articles later on.4 But now the existence of RTBF might provide some comfort to her 
plight5 since EU citizens can request the search engines for removal of such information.6 Facts 
might be parts of social media, news, archive or any other website directed through hyperlinks. 
The conflict of interest happens when someone is accessing, receiving or disseminating those 
facts while exercising his or her right to freedom of expression and other person of whom the 
information is concerned, trying to hide them for good which is the essence of right to be 
forgotten. Now, the big question is whether right to be forgotten can be considered as one of 
the restricting grounds of right to freedom of expression since both the rights have seen to 
                                                          
1 King, Peter, The Life of John Locke: With Extracts from His Correspondence, Journals And Common-Place 
Books. Creative Media Partners, LLC, 2015, p. 109 (King 2015) 
2 Rustad, Michael L & Kulevska, Sanna, Reconceptualizing The Right To Be Forgotten To Enable Transatlantic 
Data Flow. 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 2015, pages 349, 353. (Rustad and Kulevska 2015) 
3 Ibid, page 352. 
4 Whitney, Lance, Google Hit by More than 144,000 ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Requests, CNET.COM, October 10, 
2014. (Whitney 2014) (accessed on January 8, 2020) 
5 Ibid 
6 Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” Ruling (C-131/12), European Commission 2014. (Factsheet 2014) 
(accessed on January 15, 2020) 
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override each other. The phenomenon suggests that there is no standardized practice of 
establishing a definite norm. 
From the enforcement of Lisbon Treaty, right to freedom of expression has become one of the 
fundamental rights in EU. Nonetheless, recent cases decided by the CJEU, along with ECtHR 
and other Union national courts have brought the question into light that what should be the 
scope of applicability of the right.7 The formal inception of the right to be forgotten was 
introduced by the CJEU with the recognition of the Union citizens’ having  right to be 
forgotten.8 And the right was enforced against the data processor Google, a legal person whose  
exercise of right to free expression was hindered. This is because in general, a successful 
exercise of right to erasure is performed through limiting the exercise of other’s right of 
imparting or accessing or receiving the particular information which are essentially the 
elements of right to free expression. The CJEU confirmed in this regard that all those three 
abovementioned aspects relating to a data, constitutes the scope of the free expression right.9 
Thus, the highest court ruled against Google in favour of protecting personal information of 
the Union citizens through removing data from its search list which is detrimental to the fame. 
The idea is that search engine data controllers might suo moto wipe or they might be obliged 
to expunge certain information from the search list10 when the data is represented with the 
identity of the data subject and here in this paper the data subject refers to the spent criminal 
convicts. However, the data can still remain in the original publishing website which is 
accessible directly from anywhere. Since protection of both the rights are related to protection 
of fundamental principles within the Union territory, the aiders of free expression tend to think 
that it is an ill founded impediment against right to freedom of expression.11 But in reality, 
analysis of principles used in balancing approaches proved that there are no definite rules of 
determination, rather, at this point, elements of context specific determination need to be 
analysed.   
There are so many people in the EU with a criminal record among which most of them are 
living as the law-abiding citizens of the society. The point is they already served their sentence 
                                                          
7 Case C-101/01, 2003 E.C.R. I-12992, I-13004-06 
8 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEDP), Mario Costeja González, 
Case C-131/12, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para. 100(3), May 13, 2014 
9 Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, 2008 E.C.R. I-9831, para. 39, (May 8, 
2008) 
10 Supra note 8. 
11 CFR, Art. 11, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 398 
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and restored in the society through reformation. So, they do not have any connection from their 
past anymore. So, what happens when their criminal record details are online? According to 
Rosen (2012), it is the belief of the European lawmakers that an attempt from escaping 
anyone’s past is almost impossible since the virtual world remembers everything and unlearn 
nothing and the phenomenon is far more aggressive for spent criminals.12 Commissioner 
Reding (2010) rightly pointed out the particular risk for the teenagers who have entire life 
ahead and the risks of revealing lamentable information. She further added that if individuals 
do not want to keep a particular data online for further processing, then if there is not any lawful 
ground to keep it, it is the responsibility of the data controller to remove it from online.13 
However, she confirmed that it does not mean an entire erasure of the history.14  
The ‘google-effect’ can be haunting for them for lots of different reason. Their past false step 
can cause public gaze over their existence, which might hinder their way to become the full 
and mass inhabitant and start a new beginning in a broader sense. For example, they face 
difficulty in securing an indispensable job, and related matters such as insurances, possessing 
a banking relationship, in some jurisdictions prohibition on travelling, or starting studying 
again which are certainly are not the meaningful felicities of courteous temporal community.15 
Nowadays, if a search is administered in the search engines with a name or any other 
identifiable term, unimaginable amount of collected data can be compiled so easily which are 
used to have an insight of a person. However, it is unlikely that all the information will be 
relevant to a particular individual, though it presents a lot. That is why even employers might 
choose to search somebody in the Google to have an idea about that person, in particular, what 
the Internet represents about him or her.16 In fact, it became a constituent part of human 
common sense to ‘Google’ someone to find out enough information which could not be 
obtained otherwise. In that transaction, the available online news database plays a pivotal role 
in revealing past conviction records to anyone who performs search by putting in an 
                                                          
12 Rosen, Jeffrey, The Privacy Paradox: Privacy and Its Conflicting Values. Symposium Issue, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 88, 13 February 2012, page 89. 
13 Viviane Reding, Vice President, Eur. Comm’n, The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the 
Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age 5, January 22, 2012). 
14 Reding, Viviane, The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern Data 
Protection Rules in the Digital Age, Innovation Conference Digital, Life, Design. Munich, 22 January 2012. 
15 http://www.unlock.org.uk/unlock-speak-at-ico-policy-conference-the-google-effect-criminal-records-and- the-  
right-to-be-forgotten/ (accessed on 3 May 2018) 
16 https://careers.workopolis.com/advice/the-three-things-that-employers-want-to-find-out-about-you-online/ 
(accessed on 5 May 2018) 
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unchangeable name.17 This is unquestionably beyond the control of the data subjects. In this 
situation, of course, a distinct person’s capacity to protect his or her e-reputation depends on 
how efficiently that person can control the emergence of personal information. The efficiency 
again depends on the context the information is accessed and what harm it causes exactly.18 
Unfortunately, there are already so many instances which depict the negative impacts of 
‘google effect’ where employers, insurers and other organizations used their criminal records 
and acted negatively that they should not be using. It is evident from the Article 29 working 
party opinion that there has been a trend of applying sophisticated means of data processing 
mechanisms at the overall work environment which implies to entire structure of functioning 
including applying for jobs and subsequently in the job place.19 Article 88 of the GDPR fosters 
the conduction of employment process in a legitimate, transparent and proportionate way by 
imposing the obligations to the employers for respecting dignity, fundamental rights and lawful 
interests in employment related contexts. Because according to the Article 29 working party 
opinion, using publicly available information through social medias or any other sources 
available online is very common for employers to construct a personality image about a 
particular individual before recruiting.20 However, this approach is not permitted by law unless 
the employer has a legitimate interest to do.21 Unlike the United States, the EU legal system 
fosters ex-offender’s privacy and reformatory rights.22 So, the past affects the present and the 
future in a way which demands that individuals should be able to control exaggerated 
information about themselves so that no life remains permanent to an unchangeable future.  
That is why after receiving a request of removing an information, the data controllers like 
Google, Yahoo and other third party processors should take into account the of such application 
with an assumption that the data subject’s right to be forgotten would be respected  on condition 
the sentence for the offence is over past.23 However, an application will only be abdicated on 
the basis of any legitimate publication interests which is considered to outweigh the privacy 
                                                          
17 https://christopherstacey.wordpress.com/2015/11/11/ the-google-effect-criminal-records-and-the-right-to-be-
forgotten/ (accessed on 15 May 2018) 
18 Policy and Research Group of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Online Reputation, what are 
they saying about me? Discussion Paper, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2016, page 13 
19 Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 249, 8 June 2017, 
page 3 (accessed January 1, 2020) 
20 Ibid, page 11 
21 Ibid, page 14 
22 Jacobs, James B. and Larrauri, Elena, Are criminal convictions a public matter? The USA and Spain. 
Punishment and Society 14(1), 2012, pages 3-28 
23 Supra note 15 
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interests. But it does not elucidate a sound mechanism used by the data controllers whether to 
respect or reject a particular request of deletion. Though the GDPR vested great responsibility 
to the data controllers to comply with the legislation, it is not clear that if they have empowered 
themselves to set and follow a standardized mechanism since there are principles to respect 
right to be forgotten which need to be balanced with freedom of expression. For the interest of 
this paper, it needs to be equipoised in the case of criminal convicts who already past 
adjudication. 
1.2. Objectives of the Study 
This study tends to evaluate the research question and sub questions: 
1. Is there a valid presumption that we guarantee Right to be Forgotten in Spent Criminal 
Convictions? 
1.1. What are the requirements of allowing right to be forgotten? 
1.2. How right to be forgotten and freedom of expression are balanced in spent criminal 
convictions in light of current case laws? 
1.3. How implementation of principles of right to be forgotten can be achieved in spent 
criminal convictions? 
1.4. How the analysis answers the main research question? 
1.3. Limitations of the Study 
The very basics relating to personal data protection for example: definition of personal data, 
difference between natural and artificial person and some others will not be covered due to 
having limited space. Besides, certain challenges of allowing right to be forgotten, for example, 
offshoots from historian viewpoint, extraterritorial applications of GDPR and related issues 
will not be covered. On the other hand, the discussion is limited to identifying the requirements 
of allowing right to be forgotten on the basis of case laws and Article 17 of the GDPR, 
balancing public and privacy rights mechanisms, identifying and applying right to be forgotten 
principles in spent convictions while arguments, structure and discussion will be narrowed 
down to analyze different characters of spent criminal convicts. Thus, it answered the final 
research question in the last chapter while confining the study within the EU legal framework. 
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1.4. Method 
For the convenience of the study, doctrinal method has been chosen since the research has been 
designed to concentrate on the past felonious activities of the people who already served their 
sentences as well as the existing legal sources. Diversified cases will be studied and analyzed 
so that it helps not only to better understand different figures of the society but also how 
differently principles generated and applied in variant cases to determine the reciprocal weight 
each of the interests namely the publication and privacy carry and move towards a decision. 
The most prominent scholarly opinions in particular mostly writers on both the sides of privacy 
rights such as literatures from Victor Mayer-Scöhenberger, B. J. Koops, James B. Jacobs, Elena 
Larrauri, Corinna Coors, David Lindsay, Ugo Pagallo, Massimo Durante, Lawrence Siry, 
Kieron O’hara are the most remarkable that will be considered. As the study does not have any 
intention to outline any trend, quantitative apprehension lost its appeal for consideration. I 
believe, the approaches will uncover answers in thought and opinions and supplement the main 
research question by diving deeper into the problem.   
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CHAPTER 2: REQUIREMENTS OF ALLOWING RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
2.1. Introduction 
Right to be forgotten, an aspect derived from the privacy law of natural individuals, has the 
element of coercion which forces to forget a particular information from the Internet about a 
particular individual related to an event, that the person exercising right to be forgotten, wishes 
and becomes successful in exercising the right. Eventually, the lost information, if not 
censored, interferes with the right to information of the Internet users and if it becomes 
successful then, it invades users’ free expression right. Keeping that in mind, RTBF is 
prescribed in GDPR with certain limitations. To put it differently, in order to exercise right to 
be forgotten, there are certain requirements that need to be satisfied. In this chapter, discussion 
is limited to the legal requirements of sanctioning right to be forgotten only while emphasis 
will be put towards the literal and pragmatic meaning of the right to be forgotten or right to 
erasure within. 
2.2. Right to be Forgotten- Concept, Nature and Scope 
The right to be erasure often referred as right to be forgotten became a legal right within the 
EU with the enforcement of the GDPR. However, whether it was a right or a value was 
controversial for a considerable period of time.24 Some scholars perceived it as an ethical or 
social value,25 and some other described as merit or objective policy.26 However, Rouvroy’s 
(2008) perception on the right is the most relevant for a better understanding of the true essence 
of the right. While finding the formulation of the right extremely interesting, Rouvroy argued 
that it should not be conceived as merely a legitimate interest to forget and to be forgotten.27 
In essence, it is related with individual centric development which entail anyone not to be stuck 
in anything what has been expressed, rather, everyone is always allowed to change and thus 
right to be forgotten strengthens the freedom of expressing oneself at large without the horror 
                                                          
24 Koops, B. J., Forgetting footprints, shunning shadows. A critical analysis of the ‘right to be forgotten’ in big 
data practice. SCRIPTed, 2011, 8:1-28, page 231. (Koops 2011) 
25 Blanchette, J-F and Johnson, DG, Data Retention and the Panoptic Society: The Social benefits of Forgetfulness, 
18 The Information Society, 2002, pages 33-45. (Blanchette and Johnson 2002) 
See also, Dodge, M and Kitchin, R, Outlines of a World Coming into Existence: Pervasive Computing and the 
Ethics of Forgetting. 34 Environment and Planning B Planning and Design, 2007, pages 431-445.  
26 Mayer-Schöenberger, V, Delete: The virtue of forgetting in the digital age, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2009. (Mayer-Schöenberger 2009) 
27 Rouvroy, A, Réinventer l'Art d'Oublier et de se Faire Oublier dans la Société de l'Information? Version 
augmentée, 2008, (self-translation), (Rouvroy 2008) 
8 
 
that the data might be detrimental for anyone in future.28 Thus, Koops (2011) rightly said that 
a right to erasure often referred as right to be forgotten, is a legal right which is secured through 
the operation of law or any other legal mechanisms. Reding’s (2012) claimed that a RTBF 
would clarify and make other rights strong since a RTBF would empower the data subject to 
have a data removed if it is proved that the data is retained for longer period than necessary, or 
an objection against unauthorize use of a piece of data is justified. On the basis of Redding’s 
claim, Koops (2011) identified data in the way of memories in two folds: failure of accessibility 
and failure of availability in the Internet.29 To make the distinction clear, he argued 
 a RTBF occurs after following a due process and time lapse is an important factor 
 a RTBF is essentially a right to ‘clean slate’ which bars in using a particular data against 
the data subject after certain period of time and  
 a RTBF guarantees a right to freedom of expression in a way which eliminates the risk 
of using the voice or processing which otherwise would have used against the data 
subject. 
So, the first point is connected with diminishing the availability of the memory while the last 
two points are concerned with carving accessibility to the concerned memory. 
The right is demanded when it concerns the need to be forgotten by the third parties about the 
data subject’s past memories. In essence, the idea of RTBF lies within passive implication to 
manifest forgetfulness. It needs to be remembered that right to forget and right to be forgotten 
are different concepts in themselves. The first one involves active form of occurrence, but the 
later form is passive. It is true that it is important for the first person, the data subject to be 
capable of forgetting his or her own past. For this reason, the passive force to be forgotten 
which is applied to others emerged in the name of right to be forgotten so that others do not 
contradict with the data subject’s active right to forget. That is why though forgetting is the 
intrinsically natural operation of human brains the idea of right to be forgotten does not refer 
to psychological function, rather a need which demand legal reinforcement as such.30 However, 
the idea itself does not involve erasing something artificially from someone’s memory, rather 
removing or hiding something from the Internet so that it becomes difficult for others to find 
                                                          
28 Ibid, pages 25-26. 
29 Koops, Bert-Jaap, Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ 
in Big Data Practice. Social Science Research Network, December 20, 2011. (Koops 2011) 
30 Parker, ES. Cahill, Larry and McGaugh, James L., A Case of Unusual Autobiographical Remembering, 12 
Neurocase, 2006, pages 35-49. (Parker 2006) 
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and publish the embarrassing information further since now this a era of Web 2.0 which 
empowers users to create data by themselves which can essentially be data about others with 
and without other’s permission.31 So, there is a collective effort for remembering a particular 
event about someone which completely independent in nature and beyond control of the data 
subject because there might be multiple memorizers of an event.  
The issue in particular, the way how certain event has been perceived and memorized by the 
witnesses or the people around the data subject. The problem sparks concerns while in the 
future, the event or data confronts the data subject in a way which is contradictory with the 
horizon of expectations of the data subject and of the society about the data subject which paves 
a broader leeway against the data subject to have negative repercussions which affects his or 
her personal life and privacy interests robustly.  For example, if Mr. A cuts up something before 
Mr. B and Mr. C against the norms of his society, after sometime it has been found that Mr. B 
forgot about what happened, but Mr. C did not, rather, Mr. C reminds Mr. C reminds Mr. B of 
the happening. So, the collection of all the memories is undoubtedly plump which might 
involve difficulty in hiding. In this regard the folk cognition can be illustrated which says 
individuals have to subsist with all the consequences.32 The mind-blowing tale of Abu Hassan 
is worth sharing in this context which is narrated in the book of ‘One Thousand and One Nights’ 
and tale itself titled ‘The Historic Fart’. The legendary tale evolves with the introduction of 
Abu Hassan’s thundery fart in his own weeding day which is believed to be echoed which made 
all the guests fully silent. After this faux pas, he left his living place for being ashamed and 
embarrassed for ten consecutive years. His homesickness brought him back to with the 
perception that people might have forgotten everything within this long period of time. Pouring 
cold water on his hope, he found that he is not forgotten, rather he along with his faux pas 
committed ten years ago became a temporal standard within the society. For instance, upon a 
child’s asking to his mother about the time of his being born, her mom replied that it was at 
least ten years since the same year Abu Hassan farted. This forced Abu Hassan to disappear 
from his community for good.33  
                                                          
31 The Digital Universe Decade (2010) available at http://www.emc.com/collateral/demos/microsites/idc-digital-
universe/iview.htm (accessed 1 Nov 2011) 
32 O’hara, Kieron, Shadbolt, Nigel and Hall, Wendy, A Pragmatic Approach to the Right to Be Forgotten, Global 
Commission on Internet Governance, Paper Series No. 26, March 2016. (O’hara, Shadbolt and Hall 2016) 
33 Ibid 
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The plot of the story urges the need of having some mechanism in the hands of Abu Hassan so 
that he could try to conceal the memories which used to baffle him since the later chapters of 
the story construed upon the perception and interpretation of the collective memories on how 
people represent those irrespective of accuracy or inaccuracy on which Abu Hassan had no 
control over.34 Unfortunately, he did not have any way to adhere to so that he could seek for 
forgiveness unlike the present day. 
From data processing point of view, Gross and McIlveen (1999) believed that there are three 
steps which makes up a memory: 1. registering a data in a storable form, 2. storing the data 
permanently by using memory retention hardware and 3. salvation of the data from retained 
storage.35 Here, the concerned data has essentially been registered already which is contained 
in a storage. So, there still remains two crucial and most relevant thoughts regarding RTBF: 
the data is not available anymore meaning data is not stored anymore, and the data is not 
accessible anymore which means though the data is stored, it cannot be retrieved so easily. In 
order to remove the entire data from the Internet, all the links have to be deleted. On the other 
hand, if very few selected links are erased, then it makes the retrieval difficult, not impossible.36 
The later concept has been accepted for interpreting the meaning of RTBF by Union authorities 
which will be discussed broadly later on. 
Undoubtedly, the right to be forgotten is an intellectual outcome of the European legal system. 
In particular, the idea had been found in French legal system which was known as le droit à 
l’oubli which means right of oblivion which was directly linked with the spent criminal 
convicts who wanted to lead their lives as reformed and rehabilitated citizens.37 The primary 
objective was to prevent the publication of the facts related to their convictions and 
confinements. It appears to be such information which has been recorded by third parties such 
as the court, journalists and other sources. However, it triggers other related questions to 
understand the true meaning and scope of the application of right to be forgotten such as, does 
the right applies to the situations where the information in question is circulated by the data 
subject oneself? Even if the data subject publishes, what would be the case if the data has been 
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copied by others and circulated further? Apparently, the law defined broadly already which is 
to state, ‘any information related to a data subject’.38 To understand these scenarios as well as 
the scope of RTBF, Google’s contemporary chief privacy counsel Peter Fleischer’s (2011) 
concerns would be evaluated here which he had written in his blog39 to see the levels of 
controversies to have a deeper insight of the scope of right to be forgotten. 
In his blog post, he expressed his concerns in three different scenarios. Firstly, in case, 
somebody posts his or her own information online through different forums such as social 
media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter. But later on, the data subject decides to remove 
it from the concerned platforms. What might be the case in this situation? Well, the situation 
appears to be already under control since the social media websites already have put forward 
the mechanisms of deleting or removing the contents from their platforms by users on their 
own. Besides, according to the privacy policy, if they commit to delete or remove the content 
from their data bank, the authority can force the controllers to do so. In this case, the exercise 
of the right is self-initiated and in offensive.  
In the second situation, the level of controversy is much higher. The situation is perceived as 
the data subject disseminates the information in question prima facie, but third parties viz, 
friends and families continue to re post or processing by other means afterwards. Does the 
subject have a right to have the data removed which is being processed by friends, family 
members in a social media platform or even removed from any of the lists of search engines? 
The answer is unlikely simple as the first one. It appears that the data subject can ask the 
controller in this case the social media platform and even the search engine operators to remove 
it since Art. 17(1) of GDPR binds the controller to remove the content without any delay unless 
it is justified on the ground of freedom of expression under Art 17(3) of the Regulation. 
However, there are still exemption since Art. 80 provides further exemptions on the right which 
allows to continue the processing on the grounds of the processing’s being for the purposes 
that serve journalistic, artistic or literal expression interests. However, since the responsibility 
is upon data controllers, in order to continue the processing, the social media platforms need to 
prove that processing is continuing on the basis of any of the lawful grounds. However, if it 
appears to the data controllers after taking reasonable steps that it should be taken down, the 
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controller can do so and vice versa. So, even in this situation the complexity is greater than the 
previous scenario and the data subjects might still some control in posting or sharing 
information of their own. 
The last and the most complicated scenario is that if a third party by its own initiative publishes 
something about the data subject which is true but defamatory, does the data subject has the 
right to remove it? This is purely a question of exercising freedom of expression. Focusing on 
two provisions:  first, the definition of personal data contains the phrase ‘any information 
relating…’40 which draws attraction of data protection laws, second, freedom of expression is 
not absolute under Art. 10(2) of the ECHR, it can be said easily that at least the data subject 
has the right to seek removal of the data. In this situation, it is again the data controllers, or 
DPA or the local courts who have to decide the future of the processing at stake. If it 
legitimately falls within the scope of processing on the basis of journalistic, artistic or literary 
interest, then the data subject might face a rejection against a removal request. However, in this 
situation the determination of RTBF does not depend merely on these grounds only. There are 
some other factors too which is developed after the Regulation came into force. To make this 
clear, while being ambitious, Commissioner Reding stated that the Regulation has been framed 
to stand for 30 years and so it has to provide shelter for new future technologies which can be 
done through roofing the changes of the market and public opinions.41 
This paper deals with the last and the most complex scenario of right to be forgotten in which 
the spent convicts are the data subjects and their personal related to their convictions and 
incarcerations have been made available online by the third-party initiatives such as judgments, 
news, social medias, blogs and others.  
According to Margalit (2002), right to be forgotten inherently contains the substance of 
forgiveness and the forgiveness essentially means the debt that has been generated by the data 
subject previously by one’s faux pas or wrongdoing42, the debt has been paid while the criminal 
must march forward in life so that he or she can repossess the mastery through the passage of 
time and find him or her in the everyday society again (Augé 2004, 88).43 The RTBF has been 
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introduced to award data subjects to exercise the right in a defined form due to utilitarian 
reasons which are related to the rehabilitation of the offenders through restricting the access to 
their conviction data. The UK law on Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 permits the spent 
convicts to conceal their past criminal data in specific circumstances such as when applying 
for jobs, performing any civil action though it depends on the graveness of the crime. In 
addition, in Germany, criminal’s name is usually withheld while reporting any news on 
condition that the sentence has been served already. Siry and Schmitz (2012) stated that the 
German court outlined the empowerment of the spent convicts to reintegrate with the society 
as one of the grounds of their privacy rights.44 On the other hand, publication interests of the 
journalists, right to access of the historians and reporting rights publicly as some of the grounds 
of respecting freedom of expression. This is one direction of justifying RTBF. It needs to be 
mentioned that the number of permanent criminal record holders are very high in number 
nowadays.45 For example, according to BBC (2015), a 14 years of age citizen of the UK 
discovered himself in the national media coverage for committing a crime which was 
disseminating inappropriate pictures of a child. Apparently, the picture in question was of his 
own naked one which he sent via message service to a girl who shared the photo with others. 
Consequently, his misdeed was registered into the law enforcement agency’s database as a 
crime which might pose a disproportionate negative effect in his later life in particular, if he 
wants to get involved with children activities.46 
It is to be mentioned that Union Members maintain National Conviction Register (NCR) to 
have records of criminal convictions. However, communications with enforcement bodies are 
not a constituent element of criminal conviction records though the situation is slightly different 
in England and Wales where even warnings and blusters related to offences are also recorded 
along with criminal conviction information.47 Nowadays criminal cases are also disposed in 
particular Member States without direct adherence to the traditional conviction procedures. For 
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example, the mechanism is available in the Netherlands where the term ‘transaction’ is used 
instead of prosecution in which an agreement is executed between the complainant and the 
defendant where defendant might be obliged to pay a fine or carrying out other social services 
which are also considered as criminal convictions and not shared generally.48  
In the foregoing sections and chapters, requirements of allowing right to be forgotten of the 
spent convicts as well as the balancing adherences, and the fundamental principles regulating 
the norms will be outlined.  
2.3. Requirements of Right to Be Forgotten 
Before GDPR came into force in 2018, the European Data Protection Directive of 199549 
existed which is repealed with the enforcement of the GDPR. Unlike the GDPR, the Directive 
of 1995 required the Union Members to enact laws to protect individual personal data from 
unfair and unlawful processing.50 
Meanwhile, the courts and tribunals in the Member States were seen to be considerably active 
to deal with the RTBF issues, in particular, the French ‘Tibunal de grande instance de Paris’, 
Italian ‘Corte di Cassazione’, and Spanish ‘Audencia Nacional in Madrid’.51 Firstly, in 
February 2012, Tibunal de grande instance de Paris ordered Google to erase all the links that 
identified the applicant Diana Z. to her previous activities related to porno performances from 
its .com and .fr domains. The decision raised controversies due to the safe harbor clause of 
immunity for the Internet Service Providers under Art. 15 of the e-commerce Directive (D-
2000/31/EC). Then it went beyond the search engines in April 2012 when the Italian Court of 
Cassation based in Rome directed that Internet archives also should maintain the accuracy of 
an information through upgradation so that RTBF requests can be enforced. On March 2012, 
the Spanish court was already dealing with the analogous situation in its case C-131/ 12 in 
which the Audencia Nacional submitted the matter for preliminary ruling to the CJEU seeking 
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particular directions towards individual’s entitlement of seeking remedy under RTBF52 which 
later on became the first and most important judgment adhered into by the highest court of the 
Union in the area of RTBF, known as Google Spain ruling. 
After Google Spain, multiple government authorities such as radical DPAs, Article 29 Working 
Party, and national courts tended to develop RTBF. Firstly, the Working Party proved to be the 
most efficient institution outlining RTBF guidelines in 2014. After performing extensive 
consultation with Google, the Party published a set of thirteen criteria for considering a RTBF 
request which is applicable for the search engines.53 Secondly, the DPAs also retain the power 
to impose their decisions on search engines like Google by reviewing the decisions disposed 
by the search engines on condition that the claimant appeals.54 There are few examples in which 
the DPAs had their decisions, for example, French DPA ordered Google to remove all 
claimant’s links from all of its domains worldwide though that has been appealed later on.55 
Lastly, since the data subject can appeal to the national courts against any decision of a DPA, 
national courts also a role player in developing RTBF. In 2012, the Amsterdam court backed 
up Google’s decision of not allowing right to be forgotten in which the matter was to remove 
a criminal record article of an individual who used to run an escort providing services and was 
found guilty for ‘attempted incitement of contract killing’ which took place in 2012.56 The 
court further stressed on the CJEU findings in Google Spain ruling and stated that a RTBF does 
not protect the data subject from any form of discrepant processing, rather, only protects from 
‘being pursued’ ‘irrelevantly, excessively or unnecessarily’.57 However, other courts are free 
to apprehend towards more comprehensive approaches in outlining requirements and for 
providing guideline relating to the scope of RTBF if necessary, refer matters to the CJEU. 
The CJEU already confirmed that personal data protection right is a primary right for every 
natural individual which is confirmed by Art. 8(1) of the CFR, 16(1) of the TFEU.58 In addition, 
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the right is conditional and must be interpreted and enforced in a symmetric way with other 
dominions of the same status in which proportionality principle would have to be taken into 
account.59 
Furthermore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) forbids to be subjected as 
any unrestricted thrusting against someone’s privacy rights. Article 12 of the UDHR, stated 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”60 
Before shading lights on statutory requirements of RTBF, little apprehension towards accessing 
into information aspect of right to freedom of expression is plausible since the opponents of 
right to be forgotten see the right as a threat against right to freedom of expression. For 
example, according to Jeffrey Rosen (2012), the outcome of right to be forgotten through 
GDPR is not a delicate expansion of a privacy right, rather, it is one of the largest denunciations 
against freedom of expression online.61 The court opined that the serious crime will be relevant 
in order to be able to qualify a RTBF claim, it has to be excessive and unnecessarily 
defamatory. In particular, if the offence records are brought up to light without any transparent 
reason, in particular, in no purpose but to damage the reputation of the data subject involved.62 
2.3.1. Propagation towards free expression right in particular right to access to 
information 
Right to freedom of expression is dealt by both Article 10 of ECHR and Article 11 of CFR. All 
EU Members’ being signatories to ECHR, it is applied in the EU. Besides, with the 
enforcement of Lisbon treaty in 2009, the CFR also came into force in the EU. Consequently, 
even the CJEU seeks these two instruments while ruling. 
Article 10(1) of ECHR and Article 11(1) of CFR denote a very broad scope of this right in 
three folds: holding opinion, imparting information and receiving ideas and information. In 
addition to that Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, also define right to freedom of expression almost 
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identically.63 Supporting the law, the CJEU opined, the scope of freedom of expression is not 
limited to its literal meaning which is to express the thoughts only, rather, it extends till all the 
derivates of taking in and conveying facts.64 Again, in 2009, the CJEU broadened the scope of 
taking in facts65 through a ruling of this particular case. The same approach has been reaffirmed 
in another case66 where the honorable Justice acknowledged that a right to taking in information 
is essentially an aspect of entering into that information. Furthermore, while reassuring again, 
the court reminded again that the liberty of receiving data comprise of ingression of data.67 So, 
the norm of the right is well established within the framework of Union law,68 though 
subsequent sub Article 10(2) of ECHR 19(3)(a) of ICCPR mention certain limitations of 
exercising this right making it a non-exclusive right among which restriction is justified for the 
protection of the rights of others.69 Undoubtedly, the law itself does not envisage the 
absoluteness of this right. So, there ought to be a balance between exercising one’s right to 
freedom of expression and rights of others.70 
2.3.2. Requirements of right to be forgotten or right to erasure 
It is inevitable to look into the requirements of allowing a RTBF since without apprehending 
towards the requirements, it is impossible to strengthen and set out detailed data protection 
processes, obligations and enforcements. The CJEU rightly affirmed that for meaningful 
protection of personal data throughout the Union demands to define the entitlements of the data 
subjects through rights and protect those through bringing charges against the controllers of 
individual data for any of the violations of those rights. It further added the necessity of detailed 
outlining of monitoring and punishment mechanism to ensure a better compliance with the 
rules.71 However, this discussion is limited to outlining the rights and principles of the RTBF. 
2.3.2.1. Requirements under case laws with special reference to Google Spain case 
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Sometimes it has been seen that petty criminal cases had huge impact on perpetrator’s private 
life due to the presence of the embarrassment element, such as accusation for urinating in an 
open public place where urinating is not allowed. The problem is really huge when it appears 
as the top search result or even in the first page of the search list. But what happens if the 
newspaper archive fails to put the full story or even the search engine does not show the news 
of the same person’s acquittal in the same page? However, it needs to keep in mind that though 
the first news of bringing charge against the data subject is true so as the acquittal. But since 
the users are mostly interested only to look into the first page, it is possible that the information 
might mislead them to create a mental summary or misrepresent the data subject. The Google 
Spain case has more or less the same gist in which the primary cause of action arose with the 
digitization of the version of concerned newspaper. To put it differently, the online news 
archive of the newspaper.   
Ruling of this groundbreaking case came in 2014 from the highest court of the Union 
jurisdiction. The facts of the involves that Mario Costeja González, the claimant sued 
particularly against two newspaper pages which contained data relating to the claimant’s 
outdated past. Considering the publication year, which was 1998, the online archival of those 
data was claimed to be irrelevant and inaccurate. To be more specific. the complaint was on 
the basis of irrelevancy with his reputation and impertinency to public interest since the matter 
was decided more than a decade ago.72 They represented an incomplete part of the claimant’s 
life story by publishing only the event of the coerced sale of his owned housing property due 
to having a loan, but the retaking of the same after reimbursing the same loan was not posted 
in any relevant posts or anywhere. The case is mostly known as the Google Spain “Right to be 
Forgotten” ruling, where the man complained that Google’s search results of his life event 
infringed his privacy. The case is a landmark for both: recognizing right to be forgotten and 
this paper which discusses right to be forgotten in spent criminal convictions. In this case, the 
right to be forgotten is established for the applicant who at the first instance, failed to comply 
with legal requirements of paying debt, but later on, became successful to secure the ownership 
his house lawfully after paying the debts. The court found the request in his favour and 
recognized a RTBF for the first time.73 So, formal recognition itself is derived from an 
adjudication which helped the applicant to remove those records which concerned his lawfully 
paid off debts but was still available online. Certain principles were brought to light through 
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this judgment which made the requirements of allowing RTBF evident. The requirements 
formulated by the Google Spain74 on the basis of Articles 7 and 8 of the CFR, Art. 8 of the 
ECHR and Directive 95/46/EC: 
 In defining RTBF and its scope: the RTBF is exercised when a search engine operator 
erases the links (delists or deindexes) published by third parties which contain certain 
information about the individual, from its list of results when any search is initiated on 
the basis of that individual’s name,75 
  In applying RTBF: if the tidings of the information deem to be ‘inadequate, irrelevant 
or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing at issue’ 
made by the data controllers,76 
 In determining locus standi: the claimant has been exempted from showing any 
prejudice caused by the information, 
 In balancing against other rights: in the condition of the information’s being 
‘inadequate, irrelevant, or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes’ 
of the processing, the court conditionally prioritized RTBF over financial interests of 
the search engines and the interest of the public, 
 In outlining rebuts: at the time of prioritizing RTBF, nature and sensitivity of the 
information in both to the person’s private life and public interest can be taken into 
account to rebut against allowing RTBF.77 In this situation, whether the person is 
involved in any public role or figure, might be taken into consideration. In addition, the 
right is not exclusive in nature, but a proper balance needs to be struck against other 
primary rights, viz, right to freedom of expression or of the press78, 
 In mentioning duties and responsibilities: in determining each case, the search operators 
under the definition of data controllers are vested with the responsibility to move 
towards context specific determination (case-by-case) only79, 
 In describing appealing procedure: in case the RTBF application is rejected or refused, 
the applicant is allowed to go to privacy authorities or courts of law to challenge the 
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decision. However, the data controller is not in position to appeal any decision if RTBF 
is allowed.80 
In Google-Spain, the honorable court outlined a series of coherent requirements which needs 
to be fulfilled in order to be able to establish a claim of RTBF. The court found its motivation 
to limit the application of right to be forgotten in the language of right to de-referencing or de-
indexing to the search engine operators like Google and others while keeping the information 
as it remains to the publishing site which the court termed ‘third party’ which hosts the data at 
bottom.81 
In terms of tangible requirements, the court identified firstly, if the de-indexing request 
information appears on the basis of an identical name and displays in listing orientation, 
irrespective of the algorithmic priorities of the search engine operators. Secondly, the court 
attracted RTBF upon the attainment of the objective of the questioned data for which it was 
collected or processed at the first instance.82 Thirdly, the data has to be removed if found 
inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in connection with the processing 
purposes of the data controllers at all circumstances.83 Last but not the least, the impact of the 
data in data subject’s private and family life also has be taken into account. 
In terms of enforcement of the right, the court ruled that the de-listing must be effective when 
any search is sought in any particular name and the information which has been respected with 
right to be forgotten, is not available for common people anymore in the way of listing or 
charting in any search result.  
In this situation, the privacy rights under Art. 7 and 8 of the CFR, Art. 8 of ECHR and Art. 17 
of GDPR trample the legitimate business interests of the search engines and legitimate interest 
of the public in that particular information. The language derives the limitations of right to be 
forgotten referred by the court which are legitimate business interests of search engine 
operators and interest of the public. 
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However, the Google Spain ruling would not be the same if the claimant or applicant Mario 
Costeja González had any public role or the common people had any legitimate interest in his 
activities for his being a public figure or public activities. In that case, the interference in his 
public life would have been justified by publics’ interest and thus, he would fail to fulfill the 
requirements of allowing right to be forgotten. The concept of public interest will be discussed 
in chapter four. 
In short, though the Directive 95/46/EC did not guarantee RTBF explicitly, the court 
interpreted the relevant provisions of the law in the Google Spain judgment in a way which 
facilitates data subject’s claim to exercise RTBF while the court relied not only on data 
subject’s right to access to its own data but also in the event of not comporting with the 
Directive provisions, entitled the data subject to ask for correction, efface, interruption or even 
objection against those, which is the exact reflection of GDPR jurisprudence which repealed 
the Directive and will not be excessive if it is said that GDPR contains more comprehensive 
provision today comparing with the original case law, derived from Google Spain. 
In stressing the significance of Art. 17 of the GDPR, the CJEU confirmed in a case84 that the 
data subject’s right to de-referencing found its base on that respective Article which in 
particular governs the matter of right to be forgotten or right to erasure. 
2.3.2.2. Requirements under GDPR 
Different Recitals and Articles of the GDPR deal with personal data protection regulatory 
matters when it comes to the spent criminal convicts which depict not only the objectives and 
purposes of the law but also the tangible requirements in a clearer and broader context. After 
analyzing the requirements, it is found that those are coherently intertwined version of Recitals, 
Articles and Principles of GDPR. 
Natural person’s protection (here the data subjects are the spent criminal convicts) from the 
processing of their private datum has been perceived as an elemental right in Recital 1 with 
special reference to Art. 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and Art. 16(1) of the 
TFEU. While respecting all other fundamental rights mentioned in other Union documents, 
Recital 4 mentions the non-exclusive nature of data protection right which can be supported by 
one of the fundamental principles of the EU law, the principle of proportionality under Art. 5 
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of the TEU. Besides, the necessity of protecting sensitive data which has been understood as 
creating threats to fundamental rights and freedoms, attracts special protection merit85 though 
derogation is also possible on grounds of protecting personal data and other primary rights86. 
Last but not the least, though Recital 19 vests regulation responsibilities upon Member States 
for processing personal data related to criminal convictions and offences matters which are 
processed by the public authorities,  Recital 65 addressed a data subject’s right to be forgotten 
directly to be obtained of course upon establishing a breach of this Regulation provision from 
the respective data controller subject to the Union jurisdiction. 
The right is enshrined directly in Article 17 of GDPR. The right to be ‘forgotten’, known as 
the right to erasure, gives individuals not only the ability to request the removal of their 
personal data within justified time when no compelling justification is put forward by the data 
controllers (companies who fix the purpose of processing the concerned data at a specific time), 
but also makes the data controllers liable to remove the concerned data within reasonable time 
on the basis of one of the subsequent grounds apply namely, the data fulfills the collection or 
processed purposes87, data subject’s being revoking the consent for processing88, the data 
subject exercises right to object under Art. 2189, the data being processed illegally90, in 
compliance with any legal obedience under Union jurisdiction91, and data being collected in 
serving any Information Society service to a child under 16 years of age without the consent 
of the parental authority92.  
However, to discuss the derogations under Article 17(3) of the GDPR, a right to be forgotten 
can be restricted on any of the following grounds: exercising right to freedom of expression93, 
or performance of task carried out in public interest or delegated official mastery94, or public 
interest matters in scope of public health95, or for record room reasons in the ‘public interest, 
scientific, or historical research, or statistical purposes96 or establishment, and exercise or 
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defence of legal claims’97. These are those possible compelling justifications, any of which can 
override someone’s right to be forgotten. So, like right to freedom of expression, the right to 
be forgotten is also not exclusive, needs to be weighed against other dominions before 
applying.98  
So, Art. 17(1) prescribes the exclusive grounds on the basis of which right to be forgotten can 
be respected. On the contrary, Art. 17(3) puts certain limitations for deterring practice of right 
to be forgotten. These abridgements are outlined as the intertwined version of data processing 
principles and lawfulness of processing under Article 5 and 6 of the GDPR respectively. That 
is because the notion of unlawful processing of data hinges with Article 6 directly which details 
the grounds of lawful processing. To put it differently, any processing which does not comply 
with any of the grounds Art. 6 can be classified as unlawful processing, and Article 17(3) 
clarifies the derogatory justified grounds on the basis of which unlawful processing can be 
allowed. However, deeper discussion on lawful and unlawful processing is inevitable as one of 
the balancing principles in chapter four. 
2.4. Conclusion 
Analyzing the requirements of the right to be forgotten, it is perceived that application for 
exercising RTBF can be made in multiple situations. However, the law itself inflicts limitations 
on laying out the right among which wielding right to freedom of expression is one of the 
grounds of disapproving. Since this public right is also not exclusive and subject to certain 
limitations, it needs to be balanced on the basis of established principles of law. The next 
chapter tries to identify balancing issues, as well as finding the gaps in balancing. In doing so, 
it tends to discuss and analyze the existing principles so that the missing principles of balancing 
in spent criminal convicts can be identified in comport with GDPR. 
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98 Concluding the EU Data Protection Reform Essential for the Digital Single Market, European Commission Fact 
Sheet, Data Protection Day 2015, 28 January 2015, available at:  
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CHAPTER 3: BALANCING RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN WITH FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION IN SPENT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS SO FAR 
3.1. Introduction 
From the origin of right to be forgotten, one of the derivatives of privacy rights, the primary 
issue which has been seen is the balancing efforts between this privacy right and other public 
rights since the primary right for personal data protection is not an unconditional right, rather, 
its societal function also has to be taken into account according to the norms of principle of 
proportionality and Union common interest to meet its objectives to protect others’ rights and 
freedoms99. After getting recognition from GDPR, the right to be forgotten found its strong 
base, in which public right to freedom of expression has been prescribed as one of the reasons 
of limiting right to be forgotten. So, balancing is inevitable. Even the ECtHR and CJEU 
stressed multiple times that when applying privacy rights under Art. 8 of ECHR and Art. 8 of 
CFR, a balanced proceeding with other rights is indispensable.100 The balancing mechanisms 
between privacy and public rights, most relevantly, between right to be forgotten and right to 
freedom of expression gave birth to those relevant balancing principles, which are responsible 
while determining whether right to be forgotten would be allowed or not. In this regard, 
understanding the gradual development of conflicting issues between these two rights is 
extremely important to understand the balancing points derived from different viewpoints of 
Union law. 
3.2. Persistent Issues Derived from Google Spain 
The points derived of Google Spain ruling is one of the focal points as it is the first recognition 
of right to be forgotten of EU citizens which depicts the first generation of right to be forgotten 
as well as the balancing initiative between right to free expression right and RTBF. 
                                                          
99 Volker and Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen, C-92/09 and C-93/09, 9 November 2010, 
para. 48. 
100 Productores de Música de Espana (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de Espana SAU, C-275/06, 29 January 2008, 
para. 68. See also Council of Europe (2013), Case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the 
protection of personal data, available at: www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/Judgments/DP 2013 
Case Law_Eng_FINAL.pdf.  
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3.2.1. Tension in balancing between public access to information and privacy rights  
While ruling the RTBF case, the honorable court used such languages which is responsible to 
incite the controversy between penetrating into information and right to protect private data.101 
The CJEU exactly meant that since a RTBF is not an exclusive right, it will seize to subsist 
unless it has been balanced with other similar dominion such as right to free expression or other 
publication rights.102 To put it differently, precedence of right depends on each context. In 
many cases, the CJEU considered it to be justified to allow access at will to information,103 
especially true under Art. 85(1) when the data is not used unlawfully and under journalistic 
purposes exemption.104  
The spent conviction information in the form of ‘personal data’105 remains in the web and who 
is to determine whether the data subject has the RTBF or not. Because while assessing ‘public 
interest’ as one of the overriding justifications of RTBF, the honorable court held that in cases 
where a ‘legitimate right to removal’106 is found, that right overrides public’s interest in finding 
that particular information on the basis of that person’s name. It further said, acceptance of an 
individual’s interest in removing personal data outweighs the public’s interest in accessing his 
or her information under Article 11 of the CFR provides an individual with a prevailing right 
of removal.107 But the court did not mention any tangible element to prioritize between ‘public 
interest’ and ‘right to removal’ when both public and private interests are competing though 
applicant’s social position or applicant’s public activities can generate public interest which 
can outweigh a right to be forgotten so easily. 
Furthermore, another aspect pushes the controversy to another level which might occur through 
data controller like Google’s responsibility to inform the third party (who hosts the data) under 
Art. 17(2) of the GDPR, of any possible erasure that the data subject apprehended and the 
subsequent effects caused by it.108 The effects are essentially related with subsequent 
processing of the same data sought for removal. A case can be illustrated in this regard which 
occurred in the UK, in which Google already delinked his previous outdated conviction data 
                                                          
101 Supra note 8, para. 14.   
102 Ibid 
103 Ibid para. 97.   
104 Ibid para. 85.  
105 Article 4(1), supra note 40 
106 Article 17(1), supra note 40, mentions the grounds of erasing personal data by controller. 
107 Supra note 8, paras. 94, 97.   
108 Neville, Andrew, Is it a Human Right to be Forgotten? Conceptualizing the World View, 15 Santa Clara J. Int'l 
L. 157, 2017. (Neville 2017) 
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from its database,109 and informed the host of the content where the article was published.110 
Subsequently, the owner of the webpage produced another article with the notification of 
Google’s removal from its search results along with the original story from the beginning about 
the applicant’s conviction which drew attention of other media websites too and ended up 
producing more articles.111 However, the applicant further requested Google to delink all the 
article links again but this time Google denied to do so on the ground of the news articles were 
new and of public interest.112 Consequently, the applicant moved to the UK’s DPO which is 
ICO with data removal request. The ICO took into consideration certain principles such as 
whether public figure, nature of data, time lapse, detriment of the data subject’s reputation, 
graveness of offence and the involvement of journalistic material. While partially agreeing with 
Google, the ICO found that the news articles as newsworthy and of public interest, the ICO 
further stated that the public interest can also be mitigated without the name of the applicant 
which exposes him to his long spent criminal history.113 The ICO found the articles to be 
excessive in relation to the purposes, pose disproportionate detrimental effect on privacy rights 
and cause the data subject anguish and ordered Google to delink the applicant’s identity from 
the news articles.114 
So, though there is a tension between public’s right to access to information and individual’s 
privacy rights, there are also certain principles applied by different authorities which might be 
helpful to get a direction of balancing norms. 
3.2.2. Tension in balancing between public right to access to archived information and 
right to be forgotten 
This second point of tension is derived from another lawful data processing exception which 
is data collection for scientific, historical research or public research purposes, and individual’s 
right to delink that information. In Google Spain, the CJEU, while supporting to determine in 
case to case basis, ruled that the search engine data controllers can be obliged to wipe the links 
which lead anyone searching for information against a name to the site the data is hosted, under 
                                                          
109 Information Commissioner’s Office, Data Protection Act Of 1998 Supervisory Powers of The Information 
Commissioner Enforcement Notice 2015. 
110 Ibid at 14. 
111 Ibid, at 15. 
112 Ibid, at 19. 
113 Ibid, at 27. 
114 Ibid, at 29-30. 
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DPD.115 Again, it did not outline exact elements when request of removal of these unwanted 
links shall be respected because public’s right to access was already well established through 
law and case laws but right to removal was not. Thus, it left a tension between specific law and 
unspecific ruling though processing of data for archiving purposes in public interest, statistical, 
scientific or historical research purposes is allowed under data processing principles.116 
While determining RTBF, the CJEU delimited the right within search only which is performed 
through the search engines, not broader which means that the delinking was only effected in 
search engine lists only while the information remained in other places online. Indeed, the 
information can be retrieved by going to the direct website or even by searching any other thing 
except distinct name or any other identifiable element of the data subject, for example, by home 
or official address of the convict or other data subject’s name who did not apply for a RTBF. 
Consequently, the RTBF is defined as not total erasure of a data, rather, restriction in finding 
the data. That is coherent to earlier critics such as Markou’s (2014) argument who argued that 
forgotten does not mean a total erasure of the data. According to a distinguished Internet scholar 
Roberts (2015), compared the scenario metaphorically by saying that it can be compared to 
making the catalog of a library disappear, while the book is unharmed, stays in the same place 
in the collection.117 However, the analogy might seem to be not entirely right according to the 
findings of Google Spain since it more or less appearing that the books stay, so as the catalog, 
just an entry from the catalog is omitted, not the entire catalog. For better fathom, even the 
book remains in the exact place so as to say that if anyone knows the name of the author or 
category of the book, he or she can find it by going to the exact place. That is why Jimmy 
Wales opposed Google Advisory Council Report (2015, 27) which stated that exposer’s actions 
‘are being suppressed’ and said that the report is represents an exaggerated effect of RTBF118, 
which is not true, in particular, not consistent with the actual effects of RTBF. However, other 
commentators are also available who supported the Advisory Council Report to an extent by 
saying that there should not be any distinction between data available in different sources such 
as files, archives such as newspaper, or government records which can be found through search 
engine searches Google Advisory Council Report (2015, 28).  
                                                          
115 Ibid, at 100(3).   
116 Art. 5(1)(b), supra note 40. 
117 Roberts, Jeff John, The Right to be Forgotten From Google? Forget it, Says U.S. Crowd. Fortune, 12 March 
2015. (Roberts 2015). 
118 The Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, Advisory Council 2015, available at:  
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This is in pessimism to the scholars like Mayer-Schönberger (2014) and Bernal (2011) who 
wanted to see a pure deletion or erasure through a successful exercise.119 However, since the 
data is usually still available, any party with legitimate interest for example, if any bank is 
considering to provide a loan and wishes to look into a bankruptcy history, then it can perform 
a search by putting the loan applicant’s formal name or anything else though it is not guaranteed 
that it will be able to find something even if, there is any data. The distinction is this case from 
the above case is in the former situation, the search example is general, but in the latter case a 
purposive search is performed. So, the ultimate balance is that total erasure was and never 
supported by the Google Spain judgment, and so the history or the data is intact online. Besides, 
whether the data subject’s activities involve any public interest or not will be taken into 
account. According to Bernal (2011), the judgment failed to reach the milestone which many 
privacy advocates asserted to cross.120 
3.2.3. Tension between different provisions of CFR 
According to David (2014), the CJEU prioritized the RTBF in Google Spain case, while 
outlaying free expression right which also has the similar status in CFR and both are considered 
as fundamental principles after Lisbon Treaty.121 The meaning of the sentence is clear and true 
to be interpreted but to some extent. Such a statement would need to be clarified since it 
completely overlooks principle of balancing under Union law. However, CFR protects the free 
expression right quite vastly, in particular, it does not directly allow free expression to be 
hindered by a RTBF.122 But a limit on free expression on the basis of a RTBF can easily be 
accommodated through interpretation within the limitation sub Article of Art. 11. But the real 
controversial point is that though indivual data protection right is also ensured in CFR, it does 
not entail any other ground other than consent based processing and any other lawful way,123 
for example, under any of the grounds mentioned in Art. 6(1). Analogically, it does not purport 
to prioritize one right over the other.124 It manifests equality over both the rights. But in Google 
                                                          
119 Mayer-Schönberger, V. Omission of Search Results is Not a ‘Right to be Forgotten’ or the End of Google, The 
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Spain case, it recognized the right in concern (RTBF) in the form of delinking to personal data 
over right to freedom of expression in the form of restricting right to access information. 
Consequently, it remained unclear whether data protection right is prioritized over publication 
right such as free expression under CFR when it comes upon the spent convicts. Though it is 
true that one right cannot exist without the other, Article 10 of GDPR provides special 
protection on data related to criminal convictions and offences. 
3.2.4. Tension between GDPR and CJEU Practice on Privacy Rights 
Right to be forgotten recognized by GDPR which can be considered as the second generation 
of this right as well as the second generation of balancing regime. 
Article 10 of GDPR mandates the processing of personal data with a criminal offence records 
upon authorization of Union or Member State law only. Recital 19 of GDPR reaffirms the 
protection against processing of data regarding criminal convictions under specific Union legal 
Act though this enactment does not deal with this issue in particular. Furthermore, while 
outlining the derogations relating to the ‘archiving purposes in public interest, scientific or 
historical research or statistical purposes’, GDPR emphasizes on data minimization because of 
rights and freedoms of data subject.125 It is to be mentioned that data minimization has been 
mentioned or already has the status of a monumental principle in data processing area.126 To 
serve this purpose, pseudonymizing is mentioned as a tool so that data subject becomes 
unidentified. But in reality, maintaining consistency with Art. 10, the CJEU as an EU institution 
authorizes processing through its communication by publishing its rulings in form of press 
release which leaves room for tension in complying with GDPR with regard to privacy rights. 
3.3. Different Approaches in Balancing and the Gap 
This portion tends to analyze balancing approaches made by different sectors of competent 
stakeholders. In this section, based on core role players: the European Court of Justice 
approach, Scholar’s approach and GDPR approach is analyzed and thus identified the gaps 
while discussing the approaches with two real life cases.  
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3.3.1. Mention of sources of approach and real-life cases  
Easing tension or balancing the conflicting interests mentioned in the previous section can 
better be understood with real life scenarios of the victims who already spent their convictions 
or in the similar sense. In one prominent case, one claimant GC requested a link to be delinked 
from the Internet in which she is represented satirically with the city mayor to whom she served 
as a cabinet head to show the existence of an intimate relationship between them so that in the 
long run, she can derive political benefits.127 The montage of the photo in question came into 
light when GC was running provincial election in which she was a candidate but ceased from 
performing in the previous job. In the second case, ED, the claimant, requested for delinking 
two articles disclosing his criminal history of sentencing seven years imprisonment and 
additional ten years of judicial overseeing for committing sexual offence against fifteen years 
old children.128  
In addition there are some fictitious cases which are collected from different sources, mostly 
based on the UK such as guest speech of ICO’s Data Protection Conference129 and Unlock, an 
NGO who collects evidence of people who have applied for their “search results” to be 
removed by Google and others but failed.130 First case is about Sonia (anonymized) who was 
convicted of Arson, spent conviction and was doing a job in a good pace. Her previous husband 
decides to destroy her after divorce and for that he prints off the newspaper article found in 
Google about her convictions and threatens to post everywhere.131 Second case is about 
Natasha (anonymized), a school teacher convicted for four years of fraud in duty. Now after 
spending her conviction, she is again working with a school but in entry level. The employer 
informed her about less chances of progressing due to the possibility of backlash from parents 
of the children. All these happens because her conviction article is visible online.132 
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Now, based on the balancing approaches derived from the CJEU rulings, scholarly thoughts 
and the law, the following section will try to answer a logical issue in general. The issue is that 
whether the scope of Google Spain ruling demand all links connecting to the personal data to 
be obliterated. 
3.3.2. Easing the tension between privacy rights and freedom of expression by different 
sources of implications 
3.3.2.1. Implication of CJEU and ECtHR approaches in balancing privacy rights and 
freedom of expression 
Easing the tension between publication right in particular right to freedom of expression and 
individual data protection right in particular right to be forgotten proved to be difficult as both 
has to accommodate each other as well as coexist. The CJEU approach in easing the tension is 
worth mentioning in this context because the honorable court tended to balance them in 
analogous dominations. Using the same mechanism might serve as derogatory grounds from 
freedom of expression for privacy right or right to be forgotten. 
In Bodil Lindqvist133, the CJEU stated that gauge of weighing between those contradictory 
rights race against each other within the ambit of the contemporary data protection 
enactment.134 Specifically, the contemporary data protection law defined the scope of lawful 
and unlawful processing with a view to preventing illegitimate processing from happening or 
continuing under the native legal intellection.135 Article 9 of the Directive then and now Art. 
17(3) of the Regulation includes derogatory grounds that leave rooms for the Union Members 
to allow processing under any of those particular principles which is discussed broadly in the 
previous chapter. The purpose of providing the exceptions in the name of derogations are 
clearly stated in the DPD which is to ensuring the coexistence of both the rights through 
weighing each other in a particular situation.136 It needs to be kept in mind that the mechanism 
of ensuring coexistence completely differ now and before when the DPD was operative. That 
is why in Bodil Lindqvist (2003) case, the CJEU instructed the Member States to make sure the 
enforcement of the weighing mechanisms through the exercise of their freedom of approach 
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134 Ibid, para. 82 
135 Ibid, paras. 82–90.  
136 Data Protection Directive, Art. 9.   
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manifested in the  contemporary law.137 It further added show persistency while weighing since 
the domestic courts were expected to balance the competing rights by relying on the primary 
principles set by the Union legal  order.138 In another Finnish case before the ECtHR, the 
honorable court found the necessity of unifying the approaches so that a better harmonization 
can be achieved through providing guidelines for weighing competing interests.139 The 
judgment vigorously made it clear that none of the competing interests in particular, individual 
privacy right and public freedom of expression are exclusive, therefore, both of them can be 
restricted if appropriate reasons are found reconciled within the law, serve the purpose of 
providing rights and last but not the least are consistent with the democratic merits of a 
particular legal system or the society.140 
Being a privacy right, this logic can be applied to the right to be forgotten. Turning to the 
abovementioned case of GC and ED, the CJEU interpreted publication or further processing of 
data and right to freedom of expression must exclude the processing of sensitive or special 
category of information unless otherwise is expressed in the law. It is to be noted that Article 
9 of the GDPR defines special categories of data which are affiliated with expressing ‘racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions …’141 In the case of GC, the article was associated with her 
political belief and orientation. Besides, the alleged relationship was not proven which makes 
it an inaccurate data which interfered with her privacy rights unlawfully. However, she was a 
public figure at the time of performing in city council, even at the time of the judgment she 
was a figure whose activities was related to public. To put it differently, the common people 
had an interest to know about her since she was running the provincial election. But the fact 
needs to be brought up that, not only the accuracy of the information is questioned, but also the 
information was brought to light in a crucial moment when she was running her campaign. 
Journalism is clearly in bad faith and to harm her public face which was not brought anytime 
before. Furthermore, she is not connected with her previous profession anymore. In that 
situation her privacy right should be respected in the event only the information about personal 
relationship is nothing but false. 
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Turning the situation in case of ED who was convicted for sexually abusing children under 
fifteen years of age. Article 10 of the GDPR clearly forbids the processing of criminal data 
without the control of the official authority. Even it says that any maintenance of criminal 
history database has to be under official authority. Though the law seems to be attracting a 
deletion of ED’s conviction data, other factors compete to detract it. For example, the nature 
of the offence is gruesome. It might become relevant to the public as long his activities include 
the common public in general which will necessarily attract both journalism and public interest. 
For example, if at any time he starts performing duties with institutions which offer its activities 
to the children, then the common people having services from that institution have legitimate 
interest about the former criminal. It is well beyond to his right to privacy and data protection. 
Now considering the presumptive case of Sonia, availability of her conviction story for arson 
presumably does not fulfill any journalistic, artistic or literary purpose anymore since the 
journalism purpose has been achieved already and so unavailability after a certain time would 
not frustrate any of the purposes anymore. Besides, if she does not play any public role, or 
takes part in any public activity then, her data attracts to be removed online to make her life 
easier by not providing a weapon of malicious defamation by her ex-husband. On the contrary, 
the news about the school teacher Natasha might be very crucial for journalistic and public 
interest purposes as she committed the crime in a position of trust and while involved in taking 
care of children who belonged to common people. So, Google Spain might not attract the 
situation as public has legitimate interest to know everything related to their children now and 
in the future since her conviction was against society specially when she was vested with 
official duty. 
The balancing methods employed by the CJEU provide some guidance on the qualification of 
public interest but lack clear direction for the Member States since guidance does not cover all 
contemporary challenges raised after GDPR came in force. Rather it encouraged Members to 
strike a balance at some point against privacy interests which was against EU law 
harmonization. 
3.3.2.2. Implications of scholarly opinions on balancing the rights at issue 
First of all, Scholars are divided in describing the reach of RTBF. Some believe that the CJEU 
failed to ever establish the comprehension of GDPR, while other believe that it is the inception 
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of modern era of privacy rights.142 Opinions of the scholars and advocates can be considered a 
great source for looking into the balancing approaches. Niilo Jääskinen (2014), the advocate 
general thinks that since the right to free expression attracts elemental safeguard within the 
Union legal system,143 safeguards must be taken from putting the primary responsibility of 
shifting the balancing approaches to the data controllers such as the Internet search engines144 
or other data controllers, in particular, in cases of erasing a data or deciding right to be forgotten 
cases, though responsibilities have been vested upon the controllers under Art. 17(2) of the 
GDPR. He again tended to reaffirm the strong respect of freedom of expression in the EU while 
his concern about delivering discretion to search engine companies to decide whether data 
subjects will be allowed to have their right to be forgotten or not. In a nutshell, the Advocate 
General is particularly concerned about the greater power vested on the data controllers to take 
initiatives in balancing complex competing rights since great power demands greater 
responsibilities and the data controllers have the possibility to err in disposing their 
responsibilities for so many logical reasons for example, trying to avoid detrimental legal 
consequences anyway, exploiting more for their legitimate profit interests and some others. 
In addition, Advocate General Szpunar opined in his opinion on case C-136/ 17 that the settled 
case laws of the ECtHR thinks that the ability of the Internet in terms of providing data storage 
and communication is outstanding which essentially provides enhanced access to the public to 
news and other information and thus, simplifying the publication of all types of information in 
general.145 He further added that the ECHR not only applies to the data retained through the 
Internet but also to the ways and means through which it is communicated or sent or 
received.146 However, while analyzing his opinion, he stressed on the fact that the journalism 
factor used by the journalists and the listing priorities performed by the search engines are 
completely different. 
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Again, David (2014) while noting about balancing between public and private rights, stated 
that it is possible under the GDPR to show and interpret that the privacy interest of the 
individuals can poise the opposite interest of the common people.147 The GDPR, the reformed 
version of the Data Protection Directive, limits a right to be forgotten when limitations are 
plausible for ‘journalistic, artistic, or literary expression, for protecting the public interest in 
public health, or for historical, statistical, or scientific research purposes’.148 
While perceiving disclosure of personal information as governmental and non-governmental, 
Jacobs and Larrauri (2015), stated that the European countries foster the protection of one’s 
privacy through protecting honor and dignity from both types of disclosure.149 They added that 
the disclosure of particular information may lead to the violation of privacy rights irrespective 
of the information’s being true or spurious since the EU legal system never focused on a piece 
of information’s being right or wrong, rather, in the event of a communication turns detrimental 
for others’ image, the focus is drawn on if the processor of the data or the correspondent has a 
right to reveal the information or not.150  
Turning into the cases both real life and fictitious, the majority of scholars indicate that GC, 
ED, Sonia and Natasha all can either qualify or disqualify a claim of right to be forgotten 
depending on so many factors. The most commonly overlapping opinion is that right to access 
information merits particular protection in the EU. On the contrary, historians such as Antoon 
De Baets (2016) opined that the scope of derogation from right to be forgotten should expand 
to all forms of expression. However, in my opinion, the latter opinion suggests no existence of 
right to be forgotten which is contradictory and obsolete with the Union legal system. 
3.3.2.3. Harmonization through GDPR in pre-established rule of allowing the Member 
States to strike a balance  
The 1995 Directive along with CJEU’s empowerment provided the Union Member States with 
the freedom to choose appropriate approach according to their each domestic adherence with a 
view to ensuring the balancing between the rights in the event of  there is a lack of synchronous 
guidance under the law, caused disharmonization of EU law. According to the highest court, 
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Art. 13 of the Directive made the Member States free to formulate their own legislative acts to 
indicate the limitation of people’s right to information.151 Besides, the CJEU stressed on State 
involvements in performing the balancing tests. Bodil Lindqvist and Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi have been discussed already above in this context. The CJEU confirmed in 
Bodil Lindqvist that the functionality of balancing between concerned fundamental rights are 
executed from the domestic enactments of each Member State which is responsible for 
redacting the Directive.152 This is however confirmed again in another case in which the CJEU 
provided broad discretion to the Union Members to take account their culture and tradition for 
construing the rules and procedures in balancing rights.153 Now, with the enforcement of 
GDPR, harmonization is achieved through the direct effect of this law. Consequently, 
frustration of disharmonizing derived from the Directive and established by the CJEU waved 
remarkably.  
Hence, one of the greatest obstacles is that only one right has been recognized as one of the 
overriding justifications over right to be forgotten that is right to freedom of expression and 
information.154 As RTBF has already been recognized by the CJEU and it is one of the privacy 
rights, the balancing mechanisms between privacy rights and freedom of expression can be a 
tool for now to overcome the situation. In this matter, GDPR’s method for choosing between 
competing rights does not differ from those employed by the case laws though Recital 19 and 
Article 10 of GDPR jointly mandate individual’s protection against processing of data 
regarding criminal convictions and offences under specific Union legal Act which derives its 
objective to balance. 
Turning into the cases, GC and Sonia deems to be awarded with her right to be forgotten under 
GDPR since any of the overriding conditions of their right to be forgotten is presumably not 
satisfied. Even if, it becomes necessary for freedom of expression or journalistic or archiving 
purpose, then using pseudonyms would respect her rights and freedoms through data 
minimization under GDPR data processing principle under Article 5(1)(c).155 Again, in the case 
of ED and Natasha, for sake of public interest, journalism and archiving; these cases might not 
attract right to be forgotten since public’s right to access to information is necessary. People 
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have legitimate interest to know on whose hand their children is being educated and raised. 
However, other competing interests will be adhered to the upcoming sections and chapters.  
3.4. Contemporary Principles of Balancing in Motion 
To summarize, the fundamental rights must be weighed against each other so that they can co-
exist together. In that case, the highest Court showed greater importance particularly on 
weighing the legitimate interests of the public in a particular information sought.156 For this 
reason, elements responsible for making a person public or private figure and what activities 
fall within the scope of public needs to be discussed as one of the implicated principles in the 
next chapter along with implications of other principles.  
Analysing the previous discussion, it is ascertained that balancing between right to freedom of 
expression and right to be forgotten comprises balancing of multiple connotations. The 
substances are sometimes mentioned directly in law and sometimes derived from CJEU and 
ECtHR cases, and scholarly opinions. Ensuring proper balancing proved to be a herculean task 
due to several reasons among which the most important is that the principles are dynamic and 
function differently on a contextual basis. Though it found its inception in CJEU Google Spain 
ruling, it is materialized for the first time in GDPR altogether. Now, we will turn into 
identifying the active principles of balancing between RTBF and right to freedom of 
expression. 
3.4.1. Lawfulness and unlawfulness of processing 
The vagueness in balancing principle is analogously persisting under CFR and GDPR when it 
comes upon the spent convicts. On one hand, traits between Art. 8 (right to respect private and 
family life) and 11 (right to freedom of expression) of CFR remains in discomfort though the 
matter has been discussed in the earlier part of this chapter. On the other hand, Art. 10 and 
recital 19 of GDPR, vests responsibility on the data controllers to process data related to 
criminal convictions or offences only under official authority like the Data Protection Officer. 
But Art. 11 off the CFR allows to exercise freedom of expression regardless any frontier and 
public authority which clearly shows the complexity of determining lawfulness of a processing. 
Depending on the matters and principles at issue, it is clear that it is a matter of contextual 
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determination only which has to be performed in compliance with the motives and provisions 
of the law. 
The processing principles exercised by the CJEU, ECtHR and GDPR can be construed towards 
striking balancing mechanism through a gradual developmental framework. Because one thing 
in common among all the undertakings which is in accordance with law or the grounds of 
lawfulness of data processing. While setting out the parameter of lawfulness, the CJEU 
introduced terms like ‘inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant, excessive with the purposes 
of processing’. Besides, both CJEU and the ECtHR legalized processing for archiving data for 
public use in conduction of scientific or historical research. The public protection is adhered 
by allowing processing on the ground of exercising freedom of expression too. And the public 
rights are protected if that is consistent with the principles laid down by the law, meets the 
objectives of fundamental protection and comport with the values of a democratic society. 
Now, the provisions of law are clear with the enforcement of GDPR which now defines the 
scope of lawfulness of processing in its specific Articles which are discussed elaborately in 
chapter two. However, in construing the principles of case laws derived from both CJEU and 
ECtHR in collaboration with the GDPR, certain principles clearly abrogated with the 
enforcement of GDPR which were appointed during the Directive regimen. For example, while 
prioritizing between public and private interest: both the instruction and discretion of the 
Member States to adopt national provisions in accordance with personal social values and 
traditions are eroded and ousted. 
GDPR only broadened the scope from search engine to controller but did not mention any 
design who is responsible to cross check these balancing enforcements which should be 
efficient enough to respect the right to privacy and personal data of spent convicts in each case.  
At this moment, though GDPR might be the hegemony of related lawfulness of processing, it 
lacks to stir the proper balance well with special reference to the spent convicts. It can be said 
for now that the ruling started filling the gaps through outlining principles, more needs to be 
done after the expansive provisioned enforcement of GDPR which is thoroughly discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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3.4.2. Countervailing public and private interests at stake 
In terms of the apex court, it failed to formulate a test to prioritize among public and private 
interests when both interests are competing in the same litigation. This problem is still lurking 
specially after GDPR’s allusion of freedom of expression as one of the derogations to right to 
erasure. It would be reasonable to say right to freedom of expression would remain backed up 
like antecedent. Express derogation from erasure on the ground of free expression supports that 
claim while it is also true that balancing is one of the objectives of GDPR.  
Here the potential clash is again visible because GDPR mandates right to exercise of freedom 
of expression and information as one of the derogations of right to be forgotten under Art. 
17(3)(a) of GDPR. According to Recital 19 and Article 10 of GDPR, one of the objectives is 
to protect the basic freedoms and rights of the convicts. Additionally, Art. 10 (2) of ECHR 
outlines protection of reputation and rights of others as one of the reasons of restricting freedom 
of expression. So, as long right to erasure or to be forgotten has the effect of protecting other’s 
reputation and rights, balancing becomes inevitable since it might impose a restriction on 
freedom of expression which is not ensured in a comprehensive way because certain tensions 
are yet to be eased for better fathom. In this matter whether the present legislation encourages 
the removal of information needs to be discussed in the next chapter. 
In addition, for the purpose of prioritizing free expression right over RTBF, the Spanish 
Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo civil) formulated a justification test for determination through 
certain judgments. Being truth, newsworthy, and germane are the constituent elements of the 
so-called justification test.157 Firstly, the processing is deemed to be justified even if a particular 
information is detrimental if the information concerned is true or the data is the outcome of 
someone’s rational effort of determining the truth, or it is revealed in good faith. Secondly, 
newsworthiness is another criterion for an acceptable processing which is required to have 
connected with public opinion or public interest. However, a tendency of elaborating the term 
‘newsworthy’ is visible to have a broader interpretation nowadays comparing to the past which 
facilitates news media to have expansive leeway in publishing criminal history though 
publication of any criminal database or any criminal database related to a specific case is not 
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allowed. Lastly, it has to be studded with a news story which has been published earlier and 
needs to be published or processed to form an important part or complete the story.  
To make it clearer, neither distinction between acts of public’s interest and private interest, nor 
acts that fall within the ambit of those two competing interests have been revealed yet. The 
reasons are unclear on why public motivate their interest on an act which is private in nature. 
So, what are the factors which make certain acts or certain personalities public? These are not 
convened neither in any case law, nor in GDPR though both the GDPR and some of the case 
laws mention some of the components in some names associated aimed at journalistic, research, 
historical and archiving endeavors, but did not categorize directly between public and private 
interests. The same goes with the principles responsible for the construction of public and 
private individuals: by character or by activity? So, matching the balancing puzzles through 
discussing the evolving norms of both the public and private interests will be adhered in the 
next chapter. 
3.4.3. Achievement of purpose 
The terms used by the honorable ECJ in Google Spain stating ‘inadequate, irrelevant, no longer 
relevant, excessive with the purposes’ of processing literally indicates that there is a point when 
the purpose of the processing is achieved for instance, when a person is convicted of assault 
and battery. It can be assumed that after a certain period of time, the news or information 
becomes irrelevant to continue processing for journalistic or any other overriding purpose 
which means that further processing might be detrimental for the concerned individual’s 
privacy. It also might be the case where limited processing of the data continues, for example, 
if the case is being appealed and the previous data is being referred in situations where issues 
emerge. The purpose achievement situations are seen in Google Spain where the court judged 
against further processing in fulfillment of the purpose. Even purpose limitation has now 
become one of the fundamental principles of data processing in the EU. Data with special 
reference to data related to spent convictions and offences are not allowed to process without 
consent or under authority. However, there are justified grounds when data continues to be 
processing even after main purpose such as journalism is achieved but secondary purposes are 
yet to be achieved such as for employment in concerned places. But what happens with those 
conviction data which can never be processed such as revealing witness identities irrelevantly? 
or which never fully achieve the purpose of processing due to having public interest? or what 
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happens even if achieved the purpose of processing, but availability of data is necessary for 
greater public interest? All these questions will be tried to be answered in the next chapter. 
3.5. Conclusion 
To conclude, both the CJEU and scholars agree at some point that balance is needed between 
the right to be forgotten and the freedom of expression.158 But the complication is to balance 
the persisting issues enshrined in CJEU’s Google Spain decision which caused tension among 
these two rights’ elements. Historically, the right to be forgotten remained vague in its essence 
for certain reasons. Firstly, the ECJ did not decide how much weight one right should carry 
against the other. Secondly, the ECJ only ruled for search engines like Google, Yahoo, Bing 
and some others to delink the information where the original content remains with the publisher 
website. The obvious reasons for that might be the strong mandate and established respect for 
right to freedom of expression and maintaining availability of information in some way so that 
they are not lost forever. Fortunately, now the GDPR tackles both the problems in theory by 
specifying something to talk about while making data controllers liable for complying with the 
provision.  
So, balancing has just entered into youth after surviving infancy and youth maintains 
considerable lacunas in defining and interpreting principles. However, existing mechanism of 
balancing is still working but not diligently as the rights are guaranteed. Since upholding 
fundamental rights is one of the mandates of EU legal framework, more visible protection is 
indispensable. To put differently, balancing is in its second generation and we need to push it 
to third generation for more tangible norms. For this, the identified areas need to be settled 
down in the next chapter while fragmenting and elaborating the elements of each principles to 
empower the balancing with those necessary fundamental tangible principles which are the 
imminent tools of allowing right to be forgotten in spent criminal convictions. 
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CHAPTER 4: WAYS ON HOW IMPLEMENTATION OF BALANCING PRINCIPLES 
CAN BE ACHIEVED 
4.1. Introduction 
Multiple balancing principles have been identified for determining a right to be forgotten case. 
These principles are not derived from the law only, but from the interpretation and scholarly 
opinions of the law. Again, the principles did not emerge in a day, rather, those are the grains 
of almost a decade yielded by different laws, courts and scholars of the jurisdiction. Among 
the principles, the first one that comes into consideration is that whether the concerned 
processing has been done on the basis of any of the legitimate grounds of law or not. Generally, 
considering the amount of both legitimate and illegitimate grounds of processing, it can be said 
that both cover broader scope. That is why balancing is unavoidable in all cases. There are 
publication interests for the data controllers, on the other hand, publication interest can be 
contested by the privacy right holders. After apprehending a balancing approach, it can only 
be said whether a right to be forgotten can be granted or not. Now in this chapter, the balancing 
principles will be discussed thoroughly to have an insight of their discharging components. 
4.2. Implementation of Balancing Principles in Spent Criminal Convictions 
The balancing principles are necessarily identified to balance between publication and privacy 
interests in a broader context. The principles that will be analyzed here are: lawful vs. unlawful 
processing, public interest vs. legitimate interest, public vs. private figures, processing interests 
vs. personal interests, purpose achievement and passage of time. 
4.2.1. Lawful processing vs. unlawfulness processing 
4.2.1.1. Lawfulness of Processing 
Processing of personal data associated with criminal convictions and offences is directly dealt 
in Article 10 of the GDPR. The language of the Art. 10 clearly shows that personal data related 
to criminal convictions or offences has been considered as sensitive form of data under GDPR 
which needs comprehensive protection. Any processing of this type of data might be unlawful 
if that is processed without consent, or any other unlawful manner. The law itself does not 
support the processing of these sensitive data in any manner which is open and at will. This 
provision requires certain conditions to be filled in order to support the processing of data 
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related to criminal convictions or offences, namely: 1) data to be processed only on the basis 
of ‘lawfulness of processing’ principles under Art. 6(1); 2) Processing has to be under official 
authority if that has not been authorized by Member State or Union law159 under the data 
processing principle which  is analyzed in cooperation with Article 5(1)(e) in the next 
paragraph; and 3) Extensive register of criminal convictions must always be entrusted only 
under the control of official authority160 under data processing principle which is discussed in 
collaboration with Article 5(1)(f). Now the requirements discussion will turn to define unlawful 
processing under Art. 6 and data processing principles under Art. 5 consecutively. 
Unlawful processing can be defined as any processing that cannot be justified under any of the 
grounds of Art. 6(1). So, in order to be a legally processed data, it has to be processed on the 
basis of one of the grounds: the data being processed on the basis of data subject’s consent for 
a specified purpose or purposes161, or for the execution of contractual liability where data 
subject is one of the parties162, or controller is processing for complying with its legal 
requirements163, or for protecting any emergent interest of the data subject or of other natural 
person164, or processed in relation with public interest concerning matters affairs or under 
appropriate official duties165, or processed for any lawful interest borne with the data controller 
or of any third party unless and until the interest is overridden by data subject’s right to protect 
his or her data166. So, if the data is not processed on the basis of any of the above-mentioned 
grounds of this paragraph, the data shall be deemed to be processed illegally or unlawfully 
which perfectly collaborate with the data processing principles under Art. 5 of GDPR. 
Analyzing data processing principles under Art. 5, it is found that both the set of Recitals and 
Articles discussed in the previous two paragraphs are the accurate shadow of the data 
processing principles. Firstly, in determining the manner of data processing which needs to be 
lawful, fair and transparent167, data is prescribed to be processed with lawful consent of the 
data subject. Besides, if the consent is obtained from any child under the age of 16 meaning 
the data subject being a minor under this legal instrument, the consent has to be obtained from 
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its (the minor’s) legal natural guardian. Unlikely, if the consent in respect of a particular data 
processing is revoked, or upon a successful exercise of a right to object, the processing of that 
specific data should be stopped. Secondly, the data has its purpose limited for processing.168 
While achieving the consent, the processor of the data is supposed to clarify the purpose of 
processing as well. The data is not allowed to process beyond the specific purpose for which 
the consent was obtained from data subject. However, data processing will be deemed within 
legitimate purpose if that is processed for achieving any purposes in the fields of public interest, 
scientific or historical research or statistical purposes, for execution of contractual liability on 
behalf of both the data subject and the controller or other legal obedience of the data 
controller.169 This is also added as one of the derogatory grounds of allowing right to be 
forgotten in Art 17(3) of GDPR. Thirdly, even if the data is lawful for processing, the data has 
to be processed in a finite scheme which is called ‘data minimization’. In this principle, the 
data has to be processed only when it is adequate, relevant and restricted in connection to the 
purposes for which they are processed.170 To make these clear, the right to be forgotten context 
in Google Spain case need to be illustrated where the honorable court applied data 
minimization principle by mentioning that on the event of the information’s being ‘inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in connection with the purposes’ of the processing 
at issue made by the data controllers, the data has to be removed. So, the processing needs to 
be weighed against the purpose for which it is sought and only permissible if the processing 
becomes adequate, relevant and earmarked with the purpose and again the purposes can be 
related with ‘public interest, scientific or historical research or statistical purposes’, for 
execution of contractual liability on behalf of both the data subject and the controller or other 
legal obedience of the data controller under Art. 17 (1) and Art. 6 of the Regulation. Fourthly, 
in maintaining the accuracy of the data, law requires to maintain up to date data and again it 
has to be connected with the purposes of the processed data, if necessary, delete or rectify to 
maintain the accuracy of a specific piece of data.171 Successful exercises of objection rights or 
RTBF by data subjects can serve as tools of maintaining data accuracy through erasing or 
rectifying a particular data. This principle also sought in Google Spain, where the applicant 
successfully established his right to object though it was under the Data Protection Directive. 
Fifthly, the data which identifies any person, for example, in the name of a particular person, 
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shall not be retained no longer after the purpose of the specified processing.172 So, time 
limitation along with purpose limitation is adhered in here and so, after that time, the data is 
forbidden to retain with data subject’s name or other identifiable recognition173. The CJEU 
used this notion in defining a case of right to be forgotten in Google Spain by saying that a 
RTBF is exercised when a search engine operator erases the links published by third parties 
which contain certain information about the individual, from its list of results when any search 
is initiated on the basis of that individual’s name. However, processing is allowed if the data is 
stored for archiving purposed in public interest, scientific or historical researches or statistical 
purposes but subject to technical and organisational monitoring which support the last principle 
of processing which is to process with ‘integrity and confidentiality’.174 Additionally, technical 
initiatives by appropriate authorities for the security of data can also be sought for the 
protection against any unlawful processing and accidental loss or any form of destruction.175 
Last but not the least, the data controllers have been held accountable for complying all the 
data principles.176  
Furthermore, ‘Pseudonymization’ is provided in Article 89(1) as a tool of complying with both 
storage limitation and data minimization principles. In this way the data can not only be 
preserved without tampering with the original source while maintaining the privacy of the data 
subjects but also it can serve as an appropriate tool for different stakeholders of spent convicts 
which are discussed broadly in the forthcoming chapters. 
Data controllers are empowered or made accountable to exercise their discretion177 on the basis 
of legitimate grounds whether to approve or disapprove any such request upon fulfillment of 
certain requirements mentioned in Article 21(1) of the GDPR. However, the liabilities of 
controllers in cases of approving data subject’s request of exercising RTBF related issues such 
as using attainable technological measures, expense of enforcement and some others under 
Article 17(2) of the GDPR are not a subject matter neither of this chapter, nor of the paper. 
Rather, this paper intents to identify and analyse the principles of RTBF which remain dynamic 
altogether with each other and the wheel moves towards settling right to erasure cases. 
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4.2.1.2. Unlawfulness of processing 
No longer relevant and excessive in relation with purposes 
One of the complicated phrases are not having relevancy anymore. The phrase is very easy to 
say but to implement. Derived from the purpose limitation principle of the data protection law, 
the essence is to have the data deleted when it is inconsistent with the primary objective of the 
prima facie data collection. However, for further processing purposes, data can be retained in 
the events of processing for secondary usage such as for archiving for historical or research 
purposes, detection of fraud or assessment of other risks by the government.178 However there 
are challenges in ensuring the deletion or concealment of data. One of the reasons is that 
nowadays data is being collected for opaque purposes in the name of data mining.179 The 
rationale behind it is that mining of extensive is capable of showing a trend which is useful for 
a novel knowledge. The phenomenon is well understood by the idea of ‘functional creep’180. 
The notion essentially refers to a situation when a data is collected for serving a particular 
purpose, but later on it gets involved to serve another purpose, which is completely different.181 
Concern related to functional experienced a sharp rise from the early 90’s, the dawn of 
emerging the Internet. Nowadays, the concern reached its peak for using the data for other 
purposes which is totally different from the mentioned original.  
So, if there are data which are no longer relevant qualifies for removing or concealing it under 
RTBF claims, then the questions like when and why it is inevitable to submit a RTBF claim. 
The damaging point might be an issue when a data subject can be made aware and conscious 
about any existence and processing of outdated data which are no longer relevant. If the damage 
is already done, then it is definitely too late, and the measures can be taken on the basis of ex 
post undertakings which means data is being processed excessively in relation with the 
purpose. On the other hand, if it has to be impeded then the right must act to take ex ante 
undertakings such as through government systems that ensures that the controllers erase or 
minimize the data that are no longer necessary to retain, that might take place automatically 
after the passage of the expiration date fixed by the law. The ex post approach essentially refers 
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to the situation when the processing is continuous excessively for other purposes which is 
different from initially declared purpose. Again, the ex-ante approach is not expected to be 
generic since there are cases where RTBF contradicts with its limitations in the name of 
secondary or recent purposes. At this moment the ex post approach takes the lead when excess 
processing takes place and continues to damage the privacy rights which is connected to 
‘functional creep’ which usually errs to the side of further minor processing.182  
Thus, a RTBF claim on the basis of purpose limitation principle does not always succeed. 
However, it might provide a locus standi for exercising right to object which might stop further 
processing but not the erasure or delink from the search engines. However, generally when the 
data becomes irrelevant still not clear. Particular time frame such as after five, ten- or twenty-
years data concerning the convicts can be irrelevant though processing might attract legitimacy 
anytime afterwards at another unspecified time if it becomes relevant again for example, if 
once spent criminal wishes to run for an election.  
Irrelevant 
In determining irrelevancy of a data, the CJEU stressed on looking into inaccuracy of a data 
relating to a data subject. For this, in Case C-507/17, while defining the territorial applicability 
of the RTBF, the CJEU ruled on indicating Member States for ensuring an achievement of 
rectification, erasure or even blocking from data controllers, in particular, when the particular 
data is inaccurate or provides a misrepresentation of the data subject.183 Relevance with the 
purpose might be the most subjective issue in determining a RTBF case since to whom other 
than the data subject the information might be relevant, needs to be assessed in each case. In 
deciding the issue of accuracy of data, Judge Warby found in the case of NT1 that with regard 
to the claimed words and phrase to be inaccurate, no evidence was provided on behalf of the 
claimant to prove the facts to be inaccurate. Rather when the judge understood the facts and 
interpreted in the context of another case184, the claimant tended to exaggerate his claims by 
supporting his representation of self which led the judge to decline his claim of being the data 
to be inaccurate.185 On the other hand, in case of NT2, the claimant argued that the fact that the 
claimant gained financial benefits from his criminal activities to be inaccurate and the court 
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also found that to be true in the light that it provides a misrepresentation of the data subject and 
made an order of delisting.186 So, mere claim of inaccuracy is not enough, in what context it is 
inaccurate needs to be evaluated to determine having legitimate interest. Both legitimate 
interest and accuracy or relevancy related to a specific purpose is derived from context.187 
Inadequate 
It is undeniable that the term ‘inadequate’ is highly controversial due to its level of perception. 
What is inadequate for someone might be adequate for others. That is why what is inadequate 
online needs to be determined by the appropriate authorities. However, certain cases such as 
child pornography, or revenge porn and some others can be said adequate or inadequate 
instantly in terms of determining whether something happed or not. Again, inadequacy can 
well be determined in cases where someone gets acquitted but only information appears till 
bringing of charge against when a search is conducted. It is unclear that to what extent an 
inaccurate information may lead to inadequacy188 because in most of the cases, the common 
element is defamation and the data controllers have less interest in conducting any background 
check of the data subjects before processing. Even data controllers such as search engine 
providers do not distinguish between personal data and other data. In that situation, there is no 
opportunity to presume that the claimant has any kind of face value. It should be the 
responsibility of law enforcement bodies from data controllers to CJEU to determine whether 
the data in question is inadequate with regard to the purposes or not. 
4.2.2. Public interest vs. legitimate interest 
4.2.2.1. Public interest 
Public having interest in accessing a data plays an outstanding role in balancing fundamental 
rights in particular privacy and publicity rights. That is why while interpreting public interest, 
it needs to be delimited what it actually means since only the accuracy of the information 
processed disseminated online does not amount to befit to avert any other civil or criminal 
liability.189 In this consciousness derived from both civil and common law legal system, 
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individual privacy rights can better be protected within Union framework if the norm is 
established that the concerned information processed publicly not only needs to be true and 
accurate but also it must convey the specific subject matter in which the public has a ‘legitimate 
interest’. Professor Trudel marked the term as an emerging and complex one. In his book he 
described ‘public interest’ is such as term which is attributed to be defined by many disciplines 
of human science related to fundamental thoughts and actions related to human behavior such 
as morality, human ideology, common beliefs and other realizations connected with the civil 
societies.190 In simpler sense, the common sense and ethical value of the connexion era 
determine the rationale since no other law is able to impose any mastery over the value which 
regularly contradicts and changes. Having a refined view of the concept, the value is essentially 
connected with settling what the mass people is empowered for to ingress into or have a 
clinched gusto in knowing within the society in which other concepts can compete with each 
other furiously.191  
Some common law perceptions are worth mentioning in this circumstance. Justice LeBel stated 
that the definition of public interest differs contextually. However, the notion actually means 
the publication of information has not to be performed only to satisfy the quench of ‘media 
voyeurism’, rather, the purposes needs to be connected with a certain degree of societal aptness, 
or the privacy right will be considered violated.192 Again, in Grant vs. Torstar Corp193 Chief 
Justice McLachlin stated certain scenarios that a matter can be considered as of having public 
interest. That is in order to consider an issue whether it has public interest or not, the matter 
has to be the one which attracts attention from the public, or in which the common people 
shows genuine concerns due to its affecting the wellbeing of the residents, or any act involving 
nonnegligible, disgraceful or scandalous in nature. He further added, that the data subject who 
has been referred in a communication must have a public function primarily, and only having 
sensual interest is not justified. Some portion of the public needs to have a natural interest in 
learning about the information came to light.194 Undoubtedly, this will enhance personal data 
protection adherence to a greater extent. 
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4.2.2.2. Legitimate interest 
There are fundamental differences between the US and the EU in terms of role played by 
electronic and print medias in terms of disclosing criminal conviction data disclosure. In the 
EU, criminal documents such as judgments as its intact form is not available publicly so that 
anyone can inspect data with individual identities. For that interested person or entity needs to 
prove having ‘legitimate interest’. However, the researchers, or common people, or the public 
watchdogs are able to have insights of the roles of law enforcement agencies, public 
prosecutors or even court proceedings in any case or a particular category of cases such as cases 
related to bankruptcy, corruption, or even geographical location, or related to politicians. For 
example, in Spain, the judgment of a particular case is served to the case parties only, not 
communicated in an open court except certain extremely notorious matters attracted by the 
wide media coverage subject to huge attraction of public interest.195 The lower courts are also 
directed the same. However, the highest courts bring them to light after anonymizing the 
personal information of the parties through the intervention of the Centre of Judicial 
Documentation (CENDOJ) which is responsible for anonymizing the personal data of the 
defendant, as well as the witnesses and the complainants.196 To challenge the case finding 
matters, the cases in Spain are searched by the date and name of court which is highly unlikely 
in the US where a case is searched particularly by the defendant’s name197 which shows strong 
Spanish constitutional adherence for the rehabilitation of the convicts.  
Besides, in the UK, in a particular case198, in determining the issue whether the facts caused 
unlawful interference with privacy or not, against the claim of NT1 which was that the 
availability of the information caused serious damage to his subsequent behavior as a ‘pariah’ 
in his personal and professional life, even having menace commonly199, the court found that 
even though there were some sensitive health data, the information was made open in a the 
same transaction of disclosing such data which are not private at all200 supported Google’s view 
that NT1 remained associated with the same type of business activities in which he committed 
fraud and was convicted and confirmed that the information is allowed to be online so that 
common people can seek a correction on what misleading representations NT1 was making 
                                                          
195 Supra note 47. 
196 Ibid 
197 Ibid 
198 NT1 and NT2 v Google and The Information Commissioner, EWHC 799 (QB) 2018 
199 Ibid, at 149. 
200 Ibid, at 140, 145, 146. 
51 
 
after his sentence became spent.201 On the contrary, in NT2’s case, the court found that the 
inaccurate information of gaining money from his conviction was indeed making trouble for 
NT2 in having any banking amenities as well as business adhering which is amounted to having 
illegitimate interest. 
For the journalists, Jacob and Larrauri (2015) believes that reporters are free to consult or 
interview different stakeholders of a criminal proceeding for instance, investigating officers, 
judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers, if necessary, witnesses, victims, defendant or even prison 
staff in order to discover any arrest or accusation. However, European newspapers are not 
allowed to publish anything at their sweet will because there is a risk of violating criminal 
record confidentiality right.  
4.2.3. Public vs. private figures 
Distinguishing between public and private figures have become of high importance since it’s 
being having role in determining RTBF case. Derived from the DPD and the Google Spain 
case, the CJEU stressed on the applicant’s being a public figure and indicated the possibility 
of denying the application for delinking the subject matter. In having insights into public 
activities, the following can be seen. While balancing privacy and public interest, the judge 
focused on the Article 29 guidelines in the case of NT1 and NT2202 and opined that in the case 
in which NT1 is the claimant, was still involved in similar financial activities relating to lending 
money to other business and individuals prior to his conviction and added that since he was 
involved with a grave offence and his own portrayal aimed at public, he is considered a public 
figure and public has all legitimate interests to be informed of his false and misleading 
representation of own.203 To the contrary, the court found that though NT2 used to be a public 
figures, after his conviction became spent, he was not associated with the same type of business 
activities, and he pleaded guilty in the first instance, and lastly all relevant data was not seeking 
for hiding his criminal activities, his right of reformation was justified and his information 
relating to having financial gain did not attract any public interest.204  
Public figures can be defined as those people who plays their roles in a society as politicians, 
celebrities, other online personalities, or even leaders in particular areas who possess a social 
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position in their respective areas and the ability to influence and has a public role to perform.205 
Coors (2006) categorized public figures between two categories: absolute and relative public 
figures.206 According to the writer, absolute public figures are determined on the basis of their 
eminence, whose fame is well known to the common people because of their position, 
relevance and public activities, for instance, politicians, celebrities, monarchs .... .207 De Baets 
(2016) believes that exclusive public characters such as politicians, monarchs or celebrities 
dispense a disproportionate effect on a society because their activities allure the common 
people which attract remarkable media coverage.208 He further believes that absolutes figures 
control their affairs and activities online more strictly as they release and dispose their activities 
by staff and limited means.209 However, it is highly unlikely that absolute public figures who 
spent their convictions tries to exercise a RTBF because it might backfire to the intention of 
removing data online due to public’s curiosity and interest to know anything about their 
renowned individual. Later on, it might end up in having the ‘Streisand effect’210 with larger 
circulation. 
Besides, relative public figures are determined as those personalities whose reputation relies 
on a specific event, for instances, a heinous crime or important public trial.211 Relative figures 
gain attention abruptly and it may not be permanent. For those who study and rely on statistical 
or empirical data, studying relative public figures are necessary for two main reasons: for 
deriving anecdotal cases and for showing trends and aptitudes.212 The purpose of the former 
one is to serve the journalism purposes as well as entertainment of the readers and the latter 
illustrates specific trends within the society, for example, trends towards crime or racial 
discrimination. Both ignite public interest to have clear-sightedness so that knowledge can be 
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acquired in concerned matters so that preventive measures can be adopted in due time. The 
relative public figures suddenly fuel news columns and indicate issues of public debate.213 
In contrast, figures unknown to the common people, are defined as the private figures.214  
Now, turning the discussion towards spent convicts, who can be either absolutely public, 
relatively public or private figures. The level of protection for all types of applicants are 
reasonably not the same. In deciding the level of data protection, the ECtHR adhered to very 
careful interpretation which provides the least privacy protection to absolute public figures 
among all due to their prominence, then to relative public figures, then to private figures.215 
That means politicians, monarchs, celebrities enjoy have the minimum privacy spheres in 
contrast to the private figures who enjoy the largest ambit of data protection rights. And relative 
public figures lie somewhere between the highest and lowest data protection sphere, 
nonetheless, the absolute public figures also relish to a certain degree of privacy rights since 
the right itself is universal and applies to everyone.216 While stressing on the ‘reformed 
sinners’, Joel Feinberg (1975) urged the plea to leave them alone particularly even when the 
newsworthiness is allowed or not in the future, when the relevant data subject wishes to get 
admitted in the sphere of private figure from spotlight where he came once involuntarily, and 
it should not hinder the rehabilitation process in the new life where privacy interest outweighs 
the publication interest on true facts.217 
So, what remains is that at some point, absolute private figures can turn into relative public 
figures or even private figures. Anyone intending to exercise right to freedom of expression, 
performing newsworthiness, or defining any pattern can treat those data in an anonymous way 
in the figure dependent way which would suffice the purpose. 
4.2.4. Processing interests vs. personal interests 
4.2.4.1. Processing interests 
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History, statistics and research 
During the draft presentation of the regulation, Justice Commissioner Reding confirmed that 
the RTBF is nonexclusive in nature and emphasized further on keeping databases with special 
reference to newspaper archives.218 The regulation itself set the RTBF exemptions for 
‘historical, statistics and research purposes’. To meet that objective, spent convict’s data can 
be retained in anonymized form to the highest extent possible. In Google Spain, derived from 
Art. 6 of the DPD, the honorable court also mentioned that any processing performed for of 
‘historical, statistical and research’ purposes are not in contradiction with the law. However, 
the court also stressed importance on implying appropriate safeguards against any possible 
abuse of the provisions by the Member States. 
Internet archives 
It is apparent that the landmark Google Spain case consulted the phenomenon of linking data 
subject with his identifiable defamatory information retrievable from the Internet archive. The 
archive can be understood as permanent and temporary basis. The compilation of the 
information that is available in different third-party websites are permanent. On the other hand, 
while showing as the temporary archiving list, search engines play the primary role in fetching 
that information altogether in specific consolidated archived manner. In most cases, the data 
subject requests the expulsion of those links from the search engines’ temporary archives which 
appear as results which assist to lead the user to the permanent archives. Though it showed to 
have adverse impact on reformed sinners, the CJEU reaffirmed Internet archives as the 
inexorable tool of history writing.219 In 2009, the ECtHR agreed on the substantiality that  
‘‘Internet archives have … to avail news… such archives are important sources for 
education and historical research… primary function of the press in a democracy is to 
act as a public watchdog… it has a role in.. 
However, the margin of appreciation afforded to States in striking the balance between 
the competing rights is likely to be greater where news archives of past events, rather 
than news reporting of current affairs, are concerned. In particular, the duty of the press 
to act in accordance with the principles of responsible journalism by ensuring the 
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accuracy of historical, rather than perishable, information published is likely to be more 
stringent in the absence of any urgency in publishing the material’’.220 
So, while acknowledging the importance of the Internet archives, the honorable court also vests 
extraordinary responsibility on the press in maintain the accuracy of any information. The 
necessity of maintaining the informational integrity in Internet archives is even agglutinated in 
2012 by the French Court of Cassation in order to ensure individual’s right to be forgotten. In 
its case number 5525, the third section of the French court stipulated that Internet archives 
maintained by newspapers, in this case, the Italian one named Il Corriere della Sera should be 
updated with the compliance of Art. 6(d) of the Directive 46/95/EC which obligates to keep 
personal data in ‘accurate and updated form’. The logical interpretation behind that is clear 
which is to fostering right to erasure by implementing the delinking upgradation beyond the 
search engine level, by applying it in third party level and even if I think, the information is 
kept anonymized, the exploitation and the utility should remain the same for the public. 
Jacobs and Laituri (2012) argues in this regard that the European legal system considers the 
data relating to criminal convictions as ‘personal data’ which have to be treated 
confidentially.221 The Union law forbids the idea of creating individual criminal records which 
can be identified by data subject’s name through its adoption of the Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data222 and Art. 8.5 
of the DPD. Consequently, unlike the US, there are no commercial entity in the EU who is able 
to sell personalized criminal conviction databases. 
4.2.4.2. Personal interests 
Charge is on individual data subjects 
From the beginning of the right, the common trend that has been developed in such a way 
which puts the responsibility on individuals who is concerned for his or her privacy rights (Van 
der Sloot 2014). In this sense, it is the data subject who is a natural person, who is vested with 
the onus of showing that particular URL or URLs are violating their data protection right so 
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that the data subject can claim a RTBF. The fact is also true that if others are particularly keen 
in finding injururious information about the data subject, they can spontaneously retain the so 
called outdated or excessive data about the data subject which might come to light afterwards. 
The bonds of the Web can find and present it in so many contexts which might repose the threat 
again. So, the problem is not the URL, but the information which is brought by the URLs and 
individuals can keep a track of the dissemination of the URLs on which the information appears 
and contact the data controller. For this reason, it does not deem to be so easy to get rid of from 
all the information in cases it is disseminated broadly (Jones 2015) since delinked pages might 
reappear by different third-party URLs which make them available in through the search 
engines too.223 
Reconstruction of personal memories 
Memories refer the events of the past, which is basically history which include people, events, 
behavior, culture, act and everything. The informational revolution paved the way of 
unimaginable amount of memory capacity, diligence, replicability, dissemination and 
searchability which is in discomfort224 with the individual privacy rights in particular, data 
protection right such as right to be forgotten. This phenomenon made individual data online 
unprecedently which is now believed to be shaping individual identities which individuals try 
to keep in control and represent in a self-determined way. Jonathan K. Foster (2008), clinical 
professor associated in Curtin University stated in his book that ‘we are what we remember’225 
which means that removing information plays a pivotal role in reshaping the future since it 
conveys the memory from the past. So, by omitting certain events of the past, one can represent 
oneself as one likes which is assumed to be the gist of right to be forgotten which provides the 
caliber to start a new life through individual autonomy through representation. So, memories 
are data which are created on the basis of someone’s past activities, and right to be forgotten 
or attempt to hiding those data also concern those data which have been recorded in the past. 
Right to be forgotten advocate Mayer-Schönberger (2009) argued that ensuring a full control 
over personal data would empower an individual to construct their personal identity in a 
cherished manner such as starting a new articulated and prosperous life, a new understanding 
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of oneself.226 The matter is not only about constructing personal identity, but also the link with 
the past which construes the idea today while linking with the past memories of someone which 
creates the identity today to deal with the future. So, the real stake is the connection between 
past and the future. 
Paul Ricoeur (1998) said in La marque du passé (English- the mark of the past) that each 
individual has an unbelievable relation with the past and the past does not prefix anyone’s life 
to a certainty, either positive or negative, instead, it creates the forum of changing the present 
and the future in an inclusive way.227 He further adds, it is a matter of individual’s ability to 
the perception of the past which will always be related to the possibilities of the future.228 That 
means our way of understanding to perceive an individual for the future is always connected 
to the past and that is the very essence of construing person identity. Philosophically, in order 
to build an inclusive and better future the reasons and motivation have to come from the past. 
That is why while recognizing the fact that past is inseparable, for the sake of one’s story, new 
start of life and the reformed life, the knuckle from the past needs to be freed so that the past 
does not prefix or drag any reformed life in the past again.  
However, Pagallo and Durante (2014), warned not to perceive past as prefixed and 
unchangeable always, rather, he suggested to regard it as an incomplete story which is yet to 
be written to make it complete, even ‘revision or re-elaborations’.229 Most historians will 
support that view despite removing information as this is another option to move towards an 
inclusive future. However, the idea of enhancing a new meaning through connecting the dots 
of a story might not attract desirable reactions since each new tenor needs to be accessed by 
the society. Additionally, as Ricoeur (1998), interpreted: the story one tries to construct is never 
purely oneself, it is not only ‘I’, rather ‘we’ which is based on commonly shared knowledge. 
That means we do not write our own stories, but there are others around us, who assist us in 
remembering theirs as well as ours. We frequently lend our stories from others, so do they, so 
it can be said that our memories are to some extent combined, not purely individual. So, there 
is always a connection between personal memory and combined memory and the combined 
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memory is likely the collection of others’ personal memories. It needs to evaluate how personal 
and combined memories engage with each other.  
Construction and reconstruction of individual and combined memories 
At this point, how individual memories are connected with the collective memories will be 
discussed as well as the motivation of hiding any particular information will be found. 
Generally, in the way of living, individuals are raised by a society where they experience 
undergo through a shared time and place. The most important reason of one’s aspiration of 
representing oneself to the society is that he or she wants to interpose or bargain their position 
in the society as a member of it. For this reason, people want to make their present coherent 
with the past by being a member of the society they belong.230 For this reason, individuals tend 
to reconstruct their past and try to find a motivation to expose themselves as they foment. That 
is why they adhere towards exercising right to be forgotten so that they are able to narrate the 
present through very selective realignment of the their past.231 According to Pagallo and 
Durante (2014), an unfastened representation of an individual from the rest of the world is not 
entirely right nowadays since each reconstruction of the past has to  do something with a 
societal task and it is solely connected with the ways and means by which societies 
conceptually build its own collective memories.  
For the sake of understanding it better, attention needs to be focused in Reinhart Koselleck’s 
(2004) work on ‘Future’s past’ where the writer made a distinction between ‘space of 
experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’.232 The former term refers to the experience of the 
past where an individual was walking towards the present day and the fixed footsteps that has 
been left behind while moving while the later is concerned with all types foreknowledge to the 
future which includes expectations, menace or other intentions of an individual that cast an 
individual down to the future which is the moment now, the ‘living present’.233 That means 
present or living present is likely to be understood as the bright line of the experiences of the 
past and the anticipation to the future and the line is stretched particularly because every past 
experience has the ability to drag the future anticipation in the past. That is why the individuals 
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who want to reform themselves, tend to represent or rewrite their own story by hiding past 
information in which they experienced their footprints through exercising right to be forgotten 
so that their living present is represented in a way which is consistent with the societal 
expectations in which they belong.  
However, it is not impossible that an individual aspires to be integrated with other social groups 
though there is a risk of maximum semblance. Even in those situations, the hardness of unifying 
the forgotten faces with the datum has to be upheld so that the novelty of rebirth or fresh start 
could be apprehended through a meaningful data protection right. In the best possible scenarios, 
the reconstruction of the memories might go forward to conform with the ideas: ‘space of 
experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’ jointly which means line between the two ideas 
remain calm and stable to make the past and the active present somehow consistent. Nietzsche 
(1997) opined in this regard in his Untimely Mediations that default of living is forgetting, not 
remembering.234 To put it differently, living is undoubtedly possible without remembering but 
surely impossible if we are not allowed to forget. So, exercise of right to be forgotten can be 
understood as a ‘plastic force’ for someone which paves him or her a new way of getting rid 
of from the past in order to move towards a reformed life. 
After analyzing the privacy interests, it can be said that one’s life is not necessarily the story 
that solely belongs to someone. Rather identities are construed from the progression of societal 
relations. Experience is construed by common societal values and knowledge, and a right to a 
fresh start, or rebirth, or exercising right to be forgotten considers the experience of life in the 
past which exposes a personal identity in the living present so that the living present can be 
described or represented in coherence with the common shared values and expectations of the 
particular society today which might again be a constituent element of an individual’s life past 
experience after some time. So, personal or individual identification is concerned with privacy 
interests which might be at stake. But, in essence, it is not entirely individualistic, rather, related 
to the society in which the individual is a member. Similarly, while individual identity is at 
stake, it is not limited within, it always competes with its societal identity in which personal 
memories are created in full. So, privacy interests are directly linked with the society in which 
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the data subject is a member which makes the concerned data subject’s privacy interests highly 
vulnerable. 
4.2.5. Purpose achievement 
It is clear from the above discussion that purpose achievement is one of the principles of putting 
data processing at halt. Both the further publication or further processing of a data and 
successful exercise to put a stop against a processing is determined on the basis of a 
consolidated weight of legitimate interests: publicity or privacy. The examples of publicity 
interests are understood freedom of expression, right to information, values of a democratic 
society, public interest deliberations, transparent disposal and some others, while, privacy 
interests proliferation include data protection, protection of fame, fresh start, protecting identity 
and so on.235 While assessing a RTBF case, overall weight of the legitimate interests in 
particular, publication and privacy interest are weighed for  the determination whether data 
processing will be allowed on not. The scenario is relevant here if the publication and 
subsequent processing of certain facts pose detrimental impact on private individual’s 
reputation236 viz, data related to crimes, political scandals, insolvency, or failed business 
attempt.  
Purpose achievement essentially refers to publication purpose which is referred as achieved. 
Publication purpose is related to publication interest. Contrarily, putting a bar against 
publication or processing is connected to the privacy interests. While we are discussing about 
the achievement of the data publication purpose, it basically denotes the point in which the 
processing can be stopped. To put it differently, immediately after the data publication purpose 
is achieved after a certain period of time, the privacy right holders are empowered to ask for a 
stop processing of a particular data to hinder public accessibility. This clearly indicates that 
passage of time plays a crucial role in determining the point from on which the purpose of 
processing is achieved, and no further processing should take place in the future. According to 
Giovanni Sartor (2013), it is highly likely that at some point afterwards, the priority between 
interests shift, from publicity to privacy, to discontinue the transmission of an information237.  
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So, now the discussion will be divided into two parts: concept of passage of time and 
achievement of legitimate purpose with passage of time. 
4.2.6. Passage of time 
The passage of time is assumed to be influencing the online data processing interests (publicity 
and privacy interests) in inquiring positive or negative trade-offs.238 According to Rosen 
(2012), Mayer Schöenberger (2009), Koops (2011), Weber (2011) and Werro (2009), the core 
principle is that what was processed legitimately at an earlier stage, might be illegal, irrelevant 
or no longer relevant at a later time, is the very essence of digital forgetting.239 Time lapse has 
something to do with approving RTBF applications. Languages used by the CJEU in Google 
Spain, by ECtHR in Times Newspaper vs United Kingdom cases at least indicate that clearly. 
During the policy proposal time in 2011, EC commissioner Viviane Reding envisioned to 
strengthen the RTBF within the enforcement of DPD by stating a point of time in three 
situations when RTBF can be exercised. According to her, an individual is entitled to find that 
their personal data is wiped on conditions that if the information is seized to be relevant 
concerning the aim for which it was obtained, or if permission of processing is revoked by the 
data subject or if the time limit for the processing against which the permission was obtained 
expires.240 So, according to her, it involves a point of time after which further processing can 
be restricted and the point of time arrives after some passage of time.  
The notion of passage of time is extremely fuzzy because it is a real challenge is to determine 
when to consider. Since while respecting RTBF, the CJEU used terms such as ‘irrelevant, no 
longer relevant, inadequate or excessive’, it is tenacious to define each of the terms by time. 
According to CJEU, it can be used for asking the removal of a recent data on the ground of 
privacy breach, again for removing distant data on the ground of irrelevancy.241 However, 
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according to right to be forgotten scholar Victor Mayer-Schönberger, who presented right to 
be forgotten discussion in the most comprehensive way to date, proposed to shift from memory 
to forgetfulness on the basis of an expiration date.242 The same argument is available in other 
scholarly opinions too which stress to implement an expiration date in particular, in cases of 
old and irrelevant data.243  
The jurisdictions outside Europe for example, in Asia, Japan has been seen to be very diligent 
in solving matters relating to RTBF in criminal conviction cases.244 A data subject in Japan 
applied to court to make Google to erase his arrest details from its search result in September 
2014 which was primarily rejected by the court on the ground that the Japanese law did not 
vest responsibility to Google Japan to manage contents from its search results.245 However, a 
Tokyo District Court turned the decision one month later on October by ordering Google to 
remove everything associated with data subject’s name since it is causing real harm to the data 
subject by representing his past criminal activity which happened more than a decade ago.246 
While overturning another judgment decided by the Saitama District Court, the Tokyo High 
Court found that an accusation of child prostitution is a serious crime to the public and it 
continues to be momentous even after passage of five years.247 Even in the US, which 
prioritized publication rights over privacy rights historically, possess a mechanism of 
forgiveness and erasure for criminal records.248 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 
recognizing bankruptcy as heavier financial misdemeanor, says to remove the details of 
individuals bankruptcy information from consumer narration after the passage of ten years and 
other types of economic flux after seven years.249 In addition, according to California State 
law, the driving under influence (DUI) offence records are erased after ascension of ten 
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years.250 Furthermore, multiple states in the US permits adolescents to have their very selected 
criminal records obliterated after certain time lapse.251 However, the US did not any machinery 
to accept any request for delisting URLs from search engine lists that appears on the basis of 
someone’s name.252 Australia has somewhat similar enactment like the US originally since 
1990, which allows the qualified convicts to have their criminal records erased through ‘spent 
conviction schemes’.253 So, even outside the EU jurisdictions, there is hardly any specified 
time frame found which can be applied strictly. So, how much it really means by passage of 
time? After some specific time? Or at the time of applying? Or after the death of the applicant? 
Does passage of time always favor RTBF? Or after any other time dependent event?  
The questions are highly contested, and it is difficult to answer all the questions at a time. 
However, Giovanni Sartor (2014) assumed and showed some of the time dependent data 
processing cases which comports with the contemporary development of time passage 
principles specified by data protection laws. 
4.2.6.1. Achievement of purpose with passage of time 
According to Jacobs (2015), one of the strategies for ennobling reformation is expungement of 
records after certain period of time which he sees as celebration though almost every Member 
State keeps some data for good particularly related with extremely serious offences for 
example, which are punishable by life sentences.254 But most of the criminal conviction records 
can be considered as expungable on condition that subsequent charges have not been brought 
against the data subject anymore. For this purpose, the number of years can be set by the law 
itself. For instance, the UK has declared a term of 4 years imprisonment to set the parameter to 
consider certain records as non-expungable.255 That means if any person is convicted for more 
than four years then according to the UK legal system, it will not consider the record as 
expungable ever. However, though the time span varies depending different Members’ legal 
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system, for most of the European countries the expungement period is generally ten years.256 
After that time the expungement should occur automatically. However, in some countries 
Union Member States early application for such expungement can be submitted to the relevant 
court such as France, Belgium and Germany.257 In defining ‘expungement’ it does not refer to 
complete removal or demolition of the data from the record. It refers that the information is not 
disclosed generally anymore through any public or private communications.258 They can only 
be accessed by the official authorities. However, putting concrete time frame might not be 
sufficient since there has been no legal instrument which specifies particular time span for each 
category of criminal conviction data. That is why evaluation of other processing interests are 
plausible. 
For better understanding of processing interest and privacy interest is measured by gain and 
loss respectively. To make this clear, processing is gain oriented, and bar on processing due to 
privacy interest is loss oriented. This trend will referred as gain through processing and loss on 
privacy.  
There is no particular time that has been defined till when a data has to be retained in particular, 
in case of spent criminal convicts viz, six months or couple of years after the sentence has been 
spent. However, there is an indication that law might take responsibility in defining the time 
by conferring that to an appropriate authority such as the court of law and country specific data 
protection authority so that they can determine whether privacy interests override the publicity 
or processing interests. Article 7(1) of the GDPR puts the burden of proof of processing a data 
on the basis of consent to the controllers to demonstrate the justification of a processing. To 
put it differently, data subject’s position has been strengthened by making controllers 
responsible for showing that the processing interests outweigh privacy interests if processing 
is being carried out without consent because freedom to receive and distribute information 
exist. 
An assumptive case can be drawn in which the purpose of processing is completely achieved. 
For example, personal information is obtained so that a lifetime one-time electromagnetic 
fashionable bracelet can be issued in favour of a subscriber in which his personal health data 
is stored. It can only be retrieved by the authorized health officials by a specific reader in cases 
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the subscriber (the patient in this case) is not in position to disclose his or her personal 
information for identification or special health situation concerns, for example, having 
diabetes.  
4.2.6.2. Full achievement of purpose 
Since data is only embedded in patient’s bracelet, or in the cloud and nowhere else, in the event 
of losing or damaging the bracelet another one can be bought from the seller company which 
either recollects the data or preserves it in an encrypted form in the cloud. In this presumptive 
case, data collection and processing till the issuance of the bracelet is presumably allowed as 
the legal significance of processing for gain is present. Immediately after the bracelet has been 
issued in favour of the customer in exchange of consideration, further processing to the 
sensitive health data is not permissible since the legal significance of privacy interests 
seemingly overrides the commercial interest of the company towards further processing 
because of two reasons: firstly, further processing lacks the purpose of processing which has 
already been achieved which is to assign a personalized bracelet. Secondly, the further 
processing might have a disproportionate effect against privacy interests such as security of the 
information, leakage of the sensitive health data and so on. Seemingly, in this situation the loss 
of privacy is greater than the profit of processing. Consequently, after that point of time, any 
legitimate interest seizes to exist so that any can be used for the justification of any subsequent 
processing. 
4.2.6.3. Processing after purpose is achieved 
The norm is that processing of data has to be stopped imminently after attainment of purpose, 
though there are case where continuation of processing might be allowed. Most importantly, 
where the gain from processing still marginally outweighs the loss of privacy which is termed 
as ‘continued limited processing’259. The CJEU confirmed this trend in the context of RTBF 
by confirming a data subject’s having a right to be forgotten in case the retention of the data 
remains inconsistent with the Regulation. However, it allowed continuous processing of the 
same data when it is justified by law in particular for protecting the free expression right. So, 
the role that ‘passage of time’ has in continued limited processing need to be understood as the 
‘point of time’ rather than a period of time till when the processing interest continues to 
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override the privacy interest, even if the scale is marginally above. The further processing is 
barred instantly after that line crosses each other when privacy interest takes the lead and starts 
outweighing processing interests, vice versa.  
For example, a person is assumed to be held liable for inciting communal violence publicly, of 
which video clips are also available online. The footage is relevant to be processed in the court 
proceedings where the accused is convicted. After his sentence is being served, the convicted 
person can apply for removal of the links which expose him or her to the original affairs on the 
ground that further processing’s being not relevant or seizes to be relevant or excessive with 
the purposes of the processing anymore since he is a reformed criminal and it hinders his rights 
related to meaningful integration to the society. Besides, Sartor (2014) believes that there is an 
assumption that ancient data is less significant to the public and to the data subject as well since 
it provides little clue on a person who he or she is used to be and who is he or she now. The 
further processing might not be allowed since the loss to privacy comparing to the gain from 
processing is greater. 
In addition, the applicant’s full-fledged trial data is available under the judicial official 
authority though it is highly likely, his or her judgment is communicated to the public 
anonymously.  
However, it might attract relevancy of processing later on if the applicant found to be involved 
with similar criminal activities subsequently. Again, in the question of further processing of 
publicly available personal data, even after the sentence is served, depends on so many other 
factors such as the public’s having lawful interest in his or her activities, the applicant’s being 
involved with public activities, or consulting public affairs and so on. Even if, data is kept in 
an encrypted non available form which can be decrypted only if it is of utmost necessity, 
interfering with the data in a least infringing way which might serve as the achievement of 
purpose260 later on. The situation is similar in cases of newspaper archives, in which old 
information is preserved which are not available by conducting an ordinary search. Rather, 
appropriate authority has to retrieve it through appropriate reference. This is because separate 
archives are maintained for older data. Turning up to the bracelet case, if there becomes a need 
of upgradation of the device in terms of health data or the software which can be done using 
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networks, data can be processed in a minimum scale. If it is the matter of device upgradation 
only, then it should be updated without committing any personal data processing at all. 
The discussion indicates the possibility of continuing processing in the light of minor purposes 
which needs to be achieved. So, whether processing will be allowed or not after purpose is 
achieved is a highly contested question and there are no guarantees.  
4.3. Conclusion 
Clearly the principles are distinct to each other and play a different operative role in their 
respective domains. The initiation of application mostly starts with the determination whether 
a processing is lawful or unlawful. In terms of spent criminal convicts, it would not be excess 
to say that the controllers would put forward the journalistic expression and public interest 
justification in almost most of the cases. However, there are other privacy interests too which 
compete with the publication interests to determine a case. Privacy interests found its relevancy 
with the identification of specific individual and how he or she is perceived in a society. For 
that, values which construe their personal and collective memories are extremely important in 
defining their privacy violation level. Again, whether a particular privacy violation is lawful or 
not depends on the role of the data subject. It is evident from the Google Spain that in case the 
spent convict is an absolute public figure, the chances of removing links are almost none though 
the consequence might be completely opposite in the event that the spent convict or the data 
subject is a private figure. Lastly, the processing undertakings should be seized immediately 
after the purpose is achieved, however, there are certain situations when processing can be 
allowed even after the achievement of purpose. So, applying the principles are highly contested 
and completely different in each case. They need to be assessed on a case by case basis as 
confirmed by the highest court of the Union. 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND ANSWER TO THE MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
5.1. Introduction 
The basics and present situation of the right to be forgotten has already been discussed in the 
previous chapters. It is clear that it is a non-exclusive right which needs to be balanced with 
other contesting rights according to the balancing principles of the Union legal system. There 
are specific principles which regulate the operation of the right to remove any link from the 
Internet search results making it hard to find. However, the primary idea is that the data or 
information in question is not lost forever, rather, it is hard to retrieve after conducting a very 
general search so that the reformed spent criminal convicts are provided with a mechanism of 
forgiveness for their faux pas once they have committed. This surely helps them to move 
forward and integrate with the society. I consider the right as a privilege since it cannot be 
guaranteed for anyone that he or she will be awarded with an opportunity to remove their past 
data from online sphere. Though it can be said that the jurisprudence of right to be forgotten 
experienced remarkable development in the last one decade, there are still loopholes in the law 
which create the possibility to err against its practice. We will move to the principal research 
question while discussing the contemporary jurisprudence of right to be forgotten and 
identifying the gaps of the existing regulation in the light of previous discussions. 
5.2. Findings of the Study 
5.2.1. Jurisprudence of Right to Be Forgotten 
5.2.1.1. Issues to be considered 
In general, issues are formed on the basis of the claim of the applicant in each case. However, 
this section tends to discuss all relevant issues derived and identified from the previous chapters 
which is not necessarily complete and conclusive because there are certain issues which can be 
settled for all case irrespective of spent convicts only. In describing incompleteness and 
inconclusiveness, Bourne (2015) stated that several legitimate authorities such as different 
DPAs formed their own policies after the enforcement of the Google Spain judgment which 
are mostly efficient. However, it needs to be kept in mind that based on multiple reports, the 
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number of cases dealt by the DPAs are still very low.261 Based on the findings of the study, one 
of the possible apprehensions for determining a RTBF case might attract the following issues 
to be resolved: 
 Whether the processing qualifies its relationship with the natural person or people, and 
this is proven on the basis of that the information is associated with the data subject’s 
name. However, a name is not the only thing which is necessary for the identification 
of a natural data subject. In that situation, if the data subject can prove that any 
pseudonym or other description such as house address or professional place and 
designation indicate the identification of the data subject, it is enough to determine that 
it relates to a natural person, 
 Whether the data subject has any public role, or the activities related to the data subject 
involves the general public, or the data subject herself is a public figure. In this 
situation, context specific determination is necessary on case by case basis. Public’s 
legitimate interest in data subject’s activity might put a bar in exercising RTBF for 
example, if a crime has been committed in dispensing public performance, then it will 
invite public interest to know about unprofessional undertakings since it is legitimately 
connected with their concern, 
 Whether the data is related with data subject’s professional or personal life. It is 
important since in this undertaking, the less personal data one processing brings to light, 
the less attraction the RTBF would draw in any case. That means the availability of any 
concerned data would be fostered. Again, the issue of the data subject’s being public or 
private personality might drag the matter either towards concealment or towards 
publication though even absolute public figures have the minimum privacy rights, 
 Whether the concerned data of a data subject is about any criminal conviction. The 
public policy on exoneration of offenders and existence outside the search engines are 
taken into account. This situation might go mostly in favour of concealment unless the 
crime is recent and extremely notorious in nature. Since public safety is an issue, it has 
to be determined contextually on a case to case basis. Minor and older crimes with no 
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further records of criminal activities makes the way smoother towards a RTBF or 
forgiveness. 
5.2.1.2. Challenges in determining ‘data controllers’ 
The application for erasing data after certain time might mean that after using of the concerned 
data, when there is no relevancy of the data anymore, or after elapsing crime specific time, 
when the detriment to privacy rights outweighs the benefits or advantages of publication or 
further processing rights, the data subject can ask or request for the removal of the data or 
identical elements from the data. Undoubtedly, if the data is not relevant, or inaccurate or on 
the basis of any other justified objection, the data subjects have the right to see the data to be 
removed from the search engine list under Art. 17(1) of the GDPR. According to law, this right 
is essentially invoked against the data controllers (natural, or legal or public, or private entity 
who jointly with others determine the purposes and the ways of personal data processing)262. 
Nowadays it is generally the public and private entities for example, who are connected in Web 
2.0 application systems.263 
The concept and definition of controller was relatively easier at the dawn of emerging the 
Internet. But now in today’s user centric informational processing era it is highly complicated 
for different role players. For example, in cases of mobile devices, the network and application 
providers are the data controllers which should erase all data after a certain holding period in 
accordance with law.264 The same goes with the CCTV video data. Besides, in cases of personal 
third party undertakings for example, blogs and other photos and videos, where being a third 
party, the data controller is processing data of the data subject, the situation is different since 
social networking services (SNS) are involved in which the user is the controller of own posts 
and blogs who can delete or preserve at will. However, according to Article 29 Working Party 
opinion, SNS service providers are the data controllers since they principally ordain the 
purposes and ways of processing.265 However, it is also true that the users of such SNS service 
networks are also the data controllers on condition that their activities are not associated with 
the ‘household exception’.266 The household exception exempts an user to qualify as data 
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controller on the grounds that the user of SNS service performs on behalf of a commercial 
establishment such as companies or associations, or performs with an objective connected to 
political and charitable motives.267 
Apparently, there might be two situations when data processing is related with using SNS 
services. Firstly, the data subject is himself or herself the data user, and secondly, third party 
is the controller. In the former case, the data subject can remove or erase the data so easily at 
their convenience though according to Article 29 working party opinion, the SNS forum 
providers such as newspaper archives, YouTube or Facebook or other blog host websites are 
also data controllers. In that case, user can ask the provider to delete or remove the data. 
However, in the latter case, when third parties are simultaneously the users and the data 
controllers. They can be among friends and families, or other legal or natural person. In that 
case the data subject can request the controller to have the data removed or even the SNS 
service provider who is in position to remove or erase from its network systems. 
So, from the above discussion, it is clear that a request for having a data deleted needs to be 
submitted to the data controllers. To put it differently, the data controllers have not only the 
primary responsibility of determining the aims and means of personal data processing, but also 
to decide what to do with a RTBF issue in question. However, inconvenience shows up if the 
data controller appears to be a third party who falls within the so-called household exception. 
In reality, it might be difficult to point out the right data controller to whom the erasure request 
can be submitted though it appears to be so convenient in theory. 
5.2.1.3. Reason and time intertwine while seeking a right to be forgotten 
The first and foremost reason for invoking a RTBF is the retention of data which pose a specific 
detrimental effect to individual’s privacy and reputation.268 It can be interpreted to have two 
derived contexts: 1. The preservation of the data is causing detriment to the data subject now 
in the present and existing situation, and 2. The data’s being no longer necessary for any of the 
purposes and so their preservation may have a detrimental effect to the data subject at any point 
in the future. 
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The first situation is comparatively frank and related to Art. 17 of the GDPR which states about 
having a right to erasure. According to Art. 17(1): 
‘‘The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of 
personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have 
the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay…’’  
However, this claim is of course conditional not unfettered.269 Again any objection neither seek 
nor qualify as a complaint against all types of processing activities, inter alia, collection, usage, 
retrieval, publication, modification and so on. It can be limited with only one type of processing 
for example, the claimant can ask or the data controller can argue that an objection or request 
is justified with regard to storage or dissemination only but not on collection, or retrieval which 
indicates that there is a possibility of emerging the respective content in the future.270 In that 
situation, the data subject has to request the removals over and over again in the future. 
The possibility of having negative effects in the future is the second reason of requesting the 
removal of an information. The GDPR rightly perceived the risks in its provisions by requiring 
the controllers of a data not to be obliged to include identification data of the data subjects in 
cases when the purpose of the processing does not demand the identity of the data subject. In 
one of the data principles, the GDPR states in its Art 11(1): 
‘‘If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not  or do no longer 
require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be 
obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the 
data subject…’’ 
If in accordance with Koops (2011), a ‘generous data subject friendly’ interpretation is applied 
here, then it can be said generally that a request for erasure can be submitted against any 
processing which is deemed to have been processed unlawfully. However, a less data subject 
friendly interpretation is also possible, in that case, the application will solely relate particularly 
to the existing incorrect data only271 because at the least, every data subject has prima facie 
legitimate interest in having insights into probable detrimental data to be forgotten before it 
actually harms. Though it is also true that there are other legal remedies to be sought against 
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other similar right violations which can be adhered in particular, for example, remedy against 
defamation, in all scenarios the data subjects are in tough position to show the controllers or 
the court of law that the harm caused by the processing, outweighs the gain obtained by 
processing. However, it needs to be distinguished that law relating to defamation facilitates 
recourse with regard to false detrimental publications, while a RTBF for the spent criminal 
convicts mainly provides recourse against accessing true information from the public gaze.272 
That is why the probable harm in the future is not surprising and a claim for removal of data 
on the grounds of already no longer relevant, to put a stop on the data from lagging around and 
emerge immediately in a time when the risk of harming privacy rights at the peak.  
According to Art 25(1) of GDPR, which states about protecting data by design and default, the 
data controllers are required to put forward exact ‘technological and organizational’ steps such 
as ‘pseudonymization’ and ‘data minimization’  both at the time of fixing the purpose and for 
further processing to comply with other data protection principles. 
Again, in terms of storage of data is apprehended for ‘historical, statistical or scientific research 
purposes’ under Article 83, the data controllers will take necessary safeguards for those data 
which includes that data controllers will delete data immediately after the usage is done or 
anonymize or minimize in other way to comply with the data processing principles to meet the 
same end to meet particular right to be forgotten.273 This will eventually foster minimization 
of the risk which is also possible during legitimate processing of data. However, it has to be 
kept in mind that the controversies in argument occurs particularly when the data in question 
is retained for longer period than allowed which put the data subject into greater risk of 
unwarranted processing as well as exposure.  
5.2.2. Gaps of law still needs to be filled 
In order to describe the ways on how the right can be implemented, it is necessary to identify 
the loopholes of current data protection law in spent criminal convicts: 
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 There is a lack of regulation in case of user’s ‘household exception’ for publishing 
contents about the criminal convicts in social networking platforms, 
 The criminal convicts must be empowered for requesting a stop on the processing even 
during the permitted processing period, since it needs to be perceived as a mere request 
for stopping further processing which lies within the ambit of right to be forgotten, and 
it is additional and different from erasure or delink information, 
 The obligation of minimizing the data to the controllers surely leaves room for 
exercising vast and opaque discretionary power to define the scope of secondary, minor 
or other compelling purposes which might end up in longer retention of personal data 
since the controllers have legitimate business interest which necessarily err to lengthier 
retention period, 
 An application criterion for a right to erasure should be broader expanding from Art. 
17(1) to the all circumstances when the concerned data appears to be inaccurate or 
incomplete and data is being processed for purposes related to ‘functional creep’, 
  The law does not entail any specific period on how long a data is allowed to continue 
processing, rather, it leaves the responsibility on the data controllers with a wide scope 
of expounding other purposes. However, it needs to be mentioned that multiple areas 
of laws are already pertaining forgiveness through social forgetfulness, for example, in 
bankruptcy, adopting reformatory measures for juvenile delinquency, and fixing a time 
limit on retaining credit history.274 And the trend of forgiveness can also be expanded 
in other areas such as consumer law, labour, and administrative law. Thus, preventive 
criminal justice apprehension actually can have an impact on outlining guidelines on 
how privileged groups can behave with data related to under privileged groups.275 This 
is essentially the elements of a right to clean slate or forgiveness, not erasing anything 
for good.  
It is appearing that there are considerable gaps in the current data protection regulatory system 
which might undermine the full achievement of existing jurisprudence. Policies and 
enforcement on behalf of the data protection authorities in terms of powers and competences 
are in crying need. Nowadays, emphasis is put mostly on data protection by default through 
design and it well comports with the current regulation as well under Art. 25 of the GDPR. 
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Many scholars support the approach for tackling the implementation difficulties through 
applying technical enforcements in place.276 However, assessing data protection by design 
possibilities and mechanisms in case of the spent convicts are not the subject matters of this 
paper. 
5.3. Answer to the primary research question 
This primary purpose of this paper is to inquire into the issue that whether RTBF can be 
guaranteed in the cases of spent criminal convicts. To have a possible answer to that 
presumption; a broad analysis on the requirements of right to be forgotten, the balancing 
approaches of the right with other fundamental competing rights with special reference to right 
to freedom of expression, and the ways and means of the application of identified principles 
are apprehended in the previous chapters respectively. 
First of all, the concept of ‘right to be forgotten’ or ‘right to erasure’ does not attract a literal 
interpretation while defining it since it essentially does not refer to something amounted to be 
deleted or removed permanently, but to eliminate the traces which link with the search engines 
to make the retrieval easier. So, the primary concept and purpose of right to be forgotten is 
related to hiding or making retrieval hard by severing the link between the search engines and 
the third-party data hosting websites. In practice, the data stays where it was published prima 
facie, but it is not retrievable unless knowing the exact source which is amounted to narrowing 
the accessibility. In that way the data subjects which are here the convicts who already spent 
their convictions are helped to hide their conviction data to have further negative repercussions 
in their personal lives with the aim of helping them to start a new beginning in their lives. The 
complications are heavier online since the emergence of Web 2.0 facilitated unimaginable data 
storage and retrieval capacity in which anyone has access to the informational superhighway 
can be processor of those data which makes not only complex but also difficult to put a stop in 
further disseminating. 
Secondly, the age of personal data protection mechanism is couple of decades old but the 
modern right to be forgotten is being developed as an aspect of personal data protection or a 
privacy right for merely a decade. It is clear from the data protection law as well as the case 
laws from the CJEU and the ECtHR that the right to be forgotten has certain limitations which 
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make the right non-exclusive in nature. According to CJEU, when a processing is considered 
as inadequate, inaccurate or no longer relevant with regard to the purpose of processing, and 
such processing contains such personal data which unveils an individual, the data needs to be 
deindexed from the search lists. According to the data protection law, a processing has to be 
done in accordance with the data protection principles under chapter II of the GDPR. If that is 
not in accordance with the law, then the data subjects can ask for a so-called removal of that 
data under Art 17(1) of the GDPR. However, there are certain bars mentioned in Art 17(3) 
which can deter data subjects from exercising a RTBF among which the most controversial is 
that the publication right named right to freedom of expression and of the press, a well-
established legal right under Union jurisdiction. Since the scope of the latter right extends to 
receive and dissemination of information, balancing this public right with privacy right of to 
be forgotten is inevitable. 
Balancing between rights is one of the principles of the Union legal system driven by the 
principle of proportional effect. Since the Google Spain ruling, balancing is adhered between 
RTBF and free expression. It is established from the judgment that in cases the information 
related to the criminal records are lawfully published or processed then rationally public’s right 
to access to that information will be upheld. Though under Art. 10 of the GDPR, the criminal 
conviction data is considered to be processed only under the official authority, the necessity of 
journalism to convey a message to the concerned public who has legitimate interest cannot be 
underestimated. Besides, historians tend to study renowned figures, or define a criminal trend 
by analyzing statistics comprise of certain types of offences scientifically. For them, the 
internet archives are one of the most convenient sources to have insights of data. However, the 
criminal records can be found without any hint which can unveil spent criminals to the direct 
societal gaze. For this, data minimization principle can easily be adhered which is used by 
pseudonymizing the data subject so that he or she remains under cover. But in the event of the 
data subject’s being a public personality in whom the common people naturally feel the interest 
of knowing about their perpetration, data minimization rule might not be allowed so that the 
common people can have an insight in matters which involve public security. That is highly 
connected with professional omissions since in cases of omissions while performing any 
responsibility of trust, the faux pas is considered important and relevant to be published widely 
irrespective of considering any public or private figure. The purpose of processing plays a very 
important role in this perspective. If the purpose is to let people know something they are 
entitled know, then the chance of controversies is diminished. That is why even the absolute 
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public figures such as politicians, higher public officials, ministers or other celebrities do enjoy 
some level of privacy since the purpose of publishing any concerned data needs to be taken 
into account in each case differently and contextually so that unlawful processing can be 
prevented. For instance, considering the nature of the crime and the context, the court held that 
the publication of the facts was physically fair, natural and accurate.277 However, in case of 
NT2, the court stated that invading into official’s employees’ privacy with the objective of 
finding mischievous actors, is not regarded as an act of dishonesty, rather in good faith278 and 
consequently NT2 obtained an order of delisting.279  
So, in balancing between privacy and publicity rights such as right to be forgotten and freedom 
of expression, both have its own justifications and limitations. Though previously, due to the 
legal nature of Directive, depending on Union jurisdictions, there was a possibility of differing 
balancing mechanisms greatly, but now the mechanism has been and being unified after the 
enforcement of the Regulation. That is why specific principles are inevitable to emerge as a 
part of Union legal system which can be applied in deciding RTBF cases in terms of the spent 
criminal convicts in particular to decide which one would be upheld: right to freedom of 
expression or right to be forgotten. 
In assessing the ways and means of applying the above-mentioned principles in the case of 
reformed spent convicts’ right to be forgotten, the comprehensive discussion of previous 
chapter sheds light on the inherent characteristics of the principles. There are considerable 
number of elements which need to be taken into account while deciding and prioritizing the 
principles one by one namely among, lawful and unlawful processing, public and legitimate 
interest, public and private figures, processing and personal interests, purpose achievement and 
passage of time. 
Now, turning into answering the main research question, whether a RTBF can be guaranteed 
to those who spent their felonious convictions or not. The answer undoubtedly is ‘no’. There 
are no guarantees that a spent criminal convict will be awarded with a decision that enables 
them to get rid of their past every time. Every case starts with framing the competing issues to 
be resolved and the facts resolve around the law and related jurisprudence. After considering 
the elements competing principles, it is possible to reach to a decision on whether a processing 
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is lawful or unlawful. That means the claimant, or the data subject is allowed to apply for a 
right to be forgotten but it essentially has to confront the possibility of rejection. 
5.4. Conclusion. 
According to Victor Mayer-Schönberger, an Oxford professor, humans were excellent in 
forgetting than remembering before the age of Internet. That is why he suggests that we should 
focus more on forgetting rather than remembering now. Now the humans are more accurate 
and defensive in informational storage since registration, storage, availability and retrieval are 
peaking in every possible way through the advancement of communication technology. 
However, the protection of data online could not keep pace with the technological 
advancement. That is why Victor Mayer further suggested to have a pragmatic mechanism to 
memorize few. Memorizing few essentially does not mean that we are required to input less 
data in the permanent storage, but to make how hard it is to retrieve or find an information. For 
this, the focus should be on how the data can be found unlike previous when the focus was how 
data is retained. 
Technological advancement shaped a world where society has to acquire the knowledge of 
forgiveness since forgetting is not the norm anymore. Since forgetting is an indispensable part 
of human lives, the practice of forgiveness has to be cultured because forgiveness helps to 
forget.280 That is why if the world stops itself to forget anything, it will eventually destroy any 
chance for anyone for reformation and moving forward.281 At this point, it is already 
established that there is a line between public’s legitimate and illegitimate right to access an 
information. If societies enact laws with the objective of affording a spent convict to move on 
with his or her life without frontiers, then it must also reflect online. The right to be forgotten 
can play the role to be the front liner for helping people in reformation.  
From the existing demonstration of the right, it is clear that there is no security that the right 
will be granted anytime requested. But one of the most important features is the right can be 
implemented without violating other fundamental rights. Though it still did not get the status 
of an internationally recognized right, but in the near future remarkable territories should 
adhere to it inevitably for a healthier and more humane society. 
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